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WHO OWNS ‘hillary.com’?
POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CYBERSPACE
JACQUELINE D. LIPTON*
ABSTRACT
In the lead-up to the next presidential election, it will be important for candidates
both to maintain an online presence and to exercise control over bad faith uses of
domain names and web content related to their campaigns. What are the legal
implications for the domain name system? Although, for example, Senator Hillary
Clinton now owns ‘hillaryclinton.com’, the more generic ‘hillary.com’ is registered
to a software firm, Hillary Software, Inc. What about ‘hillary2008.com’? It is
registered to someone outside the Clinton campaign and is not currently in active
use. This article examines the large gaps and inconsistencies in current domain
name law and policy as to domain name use in the political context. Current
domain name policy is focused on protecting trademark uses of domain names
against bad faith commercial ‘cybersquatters’. It does not deal with protecting
important uses of domain names as part of the political process. This article
identifies the current problems with Internet domain name policy in the political
context and makes recommendations for developing clearer guidelines for uses of
political domain names. In so doing, it creates a new categorization system for
different problems confronting the political process in cyberspace, including: (a)
socially and economically wasteful political ‘cybersquatting’; (b) politicial
‘cyberfraud’ which might involve conduct such as registering a politician’s name
as a domain name to promulgate a misleading message about the politician; and,
(c) competition between politicians’ names and competing trademark interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Who owns ‘hillary.com’? Or ‘obama.com’? Or ‘guiliani.com’? How important
might some of these names be in the lead-up to the next presidential election? If past
history is anything to go by, they could be extremely important, and valuable – as John
Kerry found out the hard way after naming John Edwards as his running mate in 2004.
The ‘kerryedwards.com’ domain name was already registered to a Mr Kerry Edwards
who attempted to auction it to the highest bidder throughout the course of the 2004
presidential election.1 Internet domain names are becoming increasingly important in
political campaigns to identify political websites both for fundraising purposes, and to
disseminate information about relevant policy issues. An Internet presence is now
invaluable for a politician. The Internet can be used to reach an audience on a scale never
before possible for a fraction of the cost of other media conduits. In some respects this
potentially levels the playing field for politicians and political commentators alike
regardless of their fund raising abilities.
1

See Nobody Wants Kerryedwards.Com, August 3, 2004 (last viewed on March 14, 2007, and
available at http://www.networkworld.com/weblogs/layer8/005859.html ) (discussing attempt by Mr Kerry
Edwards to auction the domain name kerryedwards.com to the highest bidder during the course of the 2004
presidential election).
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However, an Internet presence with an easy-to-guess and easy-to-recognize
domain name can cause problems for politicians. Many of the problems stem from the
fact that the current Internet domain name regulation system is largely premised on
protecting commercial trademark interests in domain names,2 and not on protecting
political interests.3 There are significant gaps in the law when it comes to the use of
domain names in politics. Particularly during a political campaign, it is important that
those wishing to use available media to discuss candidates and their views should be able
to do so in the least socially misleading and least economically wasteful way possible.
There are no clear rules about how domain names, particularly those corresponding to
politicians’ names, may be legitimately used in the political process. Conversely, there
are no clear rules prohibiting socially wasteful or blatantly misleading use of political
domain names.
The current domain name regulation system is focused on preventing trademarkbased cybersquatting. ‘Cybersquatting’ in this context has been described as
speculatively purchasing a domain name with the intention of selling it for a profit4 –
usually with respect to a well-known name corresponding with a trademark.5 Application
of current laws to prevent misleading or wasteful registrations and uses of political
domain names is limited in two ways. The first is that it will only protect trademarked,
and therefore trademarkable, political domain names, and the second is that it will only
protect those names against bad faith cybersquatting. These are serious limitations.
Many policitican’s names will not be trademarkable6 and much of the abusive conduct
that arises in an electoral context involves misleading content on a political website rather
than an attempt to sell a particular political domain name for a profit.
This article makes several important contributions to the debate on facilitating
effective political speech in cyberspace. The first is to create a novel categorization
scheme for the various types of domain name registrations that may cause problems for
politicians. The development of this categorization scheme is essential in the political
context. In fact, the lack of a categorization system in the trademark context has caused
2

Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Names Past Trademark Policy, 40
WAKE FOREST L R 1361, 1363 (2005). (“[T]he current dispute resolution mechanisms [for domain name
disputes] are focused on the protection of commercial trademark interests, often to the detriment of other
socially important interests that may inhere in a given domain name.”)
3

id, 1425-1431 (discussion of the gaps in current regulations in the political context).

4

Ira Nathenson, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property Rights and Personal
Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 55 U PITT L REV 911, 925-926 (1997).
5

“Cybersquatting” is currently defined in the Wikipedia as: “is registering, trafficking in, or using
a domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trademark belonging to someone else.
The cybersquatter then offers to sell the domain to the person or company who owns a trademark contained
within the name at an inflated price.” (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybersquatter).
6

Generally, personal names are not registrable as trademarks: 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (c). See also
GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, ¶ 2.03[d].
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many problems of development and interpretation of the domain name regulationsystem
in recent years.7 A second important aim of this article is to identify the limitations of the
current domain name system in the political context and to suggest options for future
development that would better accommodate the needs of the political process in
cyberspace.
Part I deals with situations that may be labeled ‘political cybersquatting’ where a
registrant with no personal connection to a relevant name has registered it in order to sell
it for profit to the relevant politician or another person. Part II deals with conduct that
may be labeled as ‘political cyberfraud’ in which an individual or political group registers
a relevant domain name to promulgate a misleading message about a politician. This
category of conduct may coincide with cybersquatting in some contexts, but the legal
issues raised by the two categories of conduct are quite different. Part III deals with the
more unusual situation involving competitions between trademark holders and politicians
with similar names – for example, Hillary Software, Inc.8 and Senator Hillary Clinton if
they both wanted the ‘hillary.com’ domain name. Part IV provides conclusions and
suggests options for future developments in political domain name regulation.

II. POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING
A. POLITICIANS’ NAMES AND THE ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
Political cybersquatting may be defined as the political analog to traditional
cybersquatting. It would include registration and use of a domain name corresponding
with a politician’s name with the intent to sell the domain name for a profit to the
politician or to a third party. While the conduct is similar – and similarly motivated – in
both the trademark and the political contexts, different legal and theoretical issues arise.
Traditional cybersquatting involves people registering often multiple domain names
corresponding with registered trademarks with the intent to profit from selling the names
to the relevant trademark holders or a third party.9 This conduct was originally
prohibited under trademark infringement10 and dilution11 law. Later, additional
7

See, for example, discussion in Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First
Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONNECTICUT L R 973 (2007); Jacqueline Lipton,
Commerce vs Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, forthcoming,
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY L R, 2007; Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Names
Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L R 1361 (2005).
8

The current holder of the ‘hillary.com’ domain name.

9

“Cybersquatting” is currently defined in the Wikipedia as: “is registering, trafficking in, or using
a domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trademark belonging to someone else.
The cybersquatter then offers to sell the domain to the person or company who owns a trademark contained
within the name at an inflated price.” (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybersquatter); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
10

15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1) – statutory prohibitions against trademark infringement at the
federal level for registered and common law marks respectively, premised on creation of consumer
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regulatory measures were taken to proscribe this conduct. In the United States, the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (‘ACPA’) was inserted into the Lanham Act12
in 1999 to combat this conduct. This legislation prohibits the practice of cybersquatting
and sets out a number of ‘bad faith factors’13 that courts can use in determining whether
or not particular conduct falls within the notion of a bad faith intent to profit from
registration of a relevant domain name.
At roughly the same time, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (‘ICANN’)14 adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(‘UDRP’)15 to achieve similar ends. The UDRP has been extremely popular in practice
because it is implemented under private contract between domain name registrants and
domain name registrars16 and hence has a more global reach than domestic legislation. It
requires domain name registrants to submit to a mandatory arbitration procedure in the
event that someone complains about a bad faith registration or use of a domain name.17
The arbitrations are fast,18 inexpensive,19 and largely online procedures20 that can result
confusion as to source of relevant goods or services. See also Planned Parenthood Federation of America
v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y., 11997) (for an example of the use of traditional trademark
infringement law to prohibit unauthorized bad faith registration and use of a domain name corresponding
with someone else’s registered trademark).
11

15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (federal statutory prohibitions on trademark dilution – the lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify or distinguish goods or services regardless of consumer
confusion). See also Panavision Int’l v Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir, 1998) (an example of a successful
trademark dilution action against cybersquatting).
12

15 U.S.C. Chapter 22.

13

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).

14

The body that regulates the domain name system: see www.icann.org for further information.

15

The full text of the UDRP is available at: http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm
(last viewed on March 14, 2007).
16

UDRP, clause 2 (“By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a
domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in
your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the
domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not
registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name
in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your
domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights.”)
17

UDRP, clause 4(a) (“You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the
event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of
Procedure, that: (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
name; and (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.”)
18

A domain name arbitration will generally take less time than judicial proceedings, typically taking
around two months for a decision to be issued. See InterNic FAQs on the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP), last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at:
http://www.internic.net/faqs/udrp.html.

5

POLITICAL SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE
in transfer of a domain name to a rightful owner21 if the complainant can establish to the
arbitration panel’s satisfaction that the registration or use of the domain name was in bad
faith22 and the registrant had no legitimate purpose for registering the name.23
Political cybersquatting, however, is not always covered by these laws,
particularly if the politician’s name in question is not considered to be trademarked or
trademarkable.24 This will certainly be true of traditional trademark infringement25 and
dilution actions,26 and also general trademark-based anti-cybersquatting actions under the
ACPA.27 While some additional anticybersquatting laws do deal specifically with the
protection of individual’s names against bad faith cybersquatting even in the absence of a
trademark interest in the name, 28 they may be limited in application. The obvious
example of an anti-cybersquatting law that protects non-trademarked personal names

19

The range of fees for an arbitration will be around $1,000-$2,000 for a single arbitrator panel and
a little more for a larger panel. See InterNic FAQs on the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP), last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at: http://www.internic.net/faqs/udrp.html.
20

Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, last viewed on March 14, 2007 and
available at: http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm: Rule 3(b) (complaint to be submitted in
hard copy and electronic format); Rule 5(b) (response to be submitted in hard copy and electronic format);
Rule 13 (no in-person hearings); Rule 16(b) (Panel decisions to be posted on panel web site).
21

UDRP, clause 4(i) (“The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding before
an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain name or the transfer
of your domain name registration to the complainant.”).
22

UDRP, clause 4(b).

23

UDRP, clause 4(c).

24

Generally, personal names are not registrable as trademarks: 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (c). See also
GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, ¶ 2.03[d].
25

15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1) (federal statutory prohibitions against trademark infringement
for common law and registered marks respectively, premised on creation of consumer confusion as to
source of relevant goods or services.)
26

15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (federal statutory prohibitions on trademark dilution prohibiting the
lessening of a mark’s capacity to distinguish particular goods or services regardless of consumer
confusion).
27

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (prohibition of cybersquatting based on registration of a domain name similar
to a trademark).
28

15 U.S.C. § 1129 (this section protects personal names against cybersquatting and is not limited to
trademark interests in personal names).
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against cybersquatting is § 1129 of the Lanham Act,29 introduced in 1999 as part of the
ACPA:30
Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name
of another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly
similar thereto, without that person’s consent, with the specific
intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for
financial gain to that person or any third party, shall be liable in a
civil action by such person.31
This will cover some political cybersquatting, although there will also be
exceptions. In the ‘kerryedwards.com’ scenario,32 for example, it might technically have
been possible for the registrant, Mr Kerry Edwards, to mount several defenses to an
ACPA challenge. He might have argued that the domain name in question did not
correspond to the name of another living person on the basis that ‘Kerry Edwards’ was
not the name of either Senator Kerry or Senator Edwards, but rather an amalgam of both
of their names. He might also have argued that, even if the name in question did consist
of the name of another living person, it also consisted of his own personal name – Kerry
Edwards – and that his own right to a domain name corresponding to his personal name
must equally be protected by §1129.
With respect to the first argument, the defense might fail on the basis that § 1129
also protects complainants against bad faith registrations of domain names that are
‘substantially and confusingly similar’ to their own personal names. Arguably, the
amalgam of the names Kerry and Edwards in ‘kerryedwards.com’ in the lead up to a
presidential election where Senators Kerry and Edwards names are those on the
presidential ticket would be considered a registration of a name ‘substantially and
confusingly similar’ to the Senators’ respective personal names. The second potential
defense argument may be more problematic, but a court taking at least an economic
analysis of the situation may well find that the use of the name for a presidential
campaign would be less socially and economically wasteful than the use of a name by a
person with a corresponding personal name who is simply trying to make a profit from
selling the name.

29

15 U.S.C. § 1129.

30

This provision is to be distinguished from 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) which is also part of ACPA but is
restricted to prohibitions on bad faith cybersquatting where the cybersquatter has registered a domain name
that is similar to a trademark, as opposed to a personal name.
31

15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).

32

See Kerry Edwards is Real and Sells Kerryedwards.Com, July 19, 2004, last viewed on March 14,
2007 and available at:
http://www.editorsweblog.org/news/2004/07/kerry_edwards_is_real_and_sells_kerryedw.php
(“KerryEdwards.com is owned by a 34-year-old man named Kerry Edwards, a part-time bail bondsman in
Indianapolis. He registered KerryEdwards.com two years ago as a personal site for family and friends.”)
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There were two additional unusual factors about the ‘kerryedwards.com’ situation
that may well not be repeated in many future cases. For one thing, Mr Kerry Edwards
happened fortuitously to have registered the domain name several years before the
presidential campaign featuring Senators Kerry and Edwards was launched.33 Thus, in
this particular case, had the senators brought an action against Mr Kerry Edwards, they
may well have failed on the basis that he had not registered the domain name34 with the
intent to profit from its sale as required by § 1129.35 The other factor, which is of course
related to this first factor, is that Mr Kerry Edwards happened to have a personal name
that corresponded with the two names on the presidential ticket. This is unlikely to
happen in many future cases. However, it is possible that a private individual might have
a personal name corresponding with an individual politician’s name in a future case and
this could raise many of the difficulties that could have arisen had ‘kerryedwards.com’
been disputed in the lead-up to the 2004 presidential election. How many John McCains
are out there, for example, or Joe Bidens or Chris Dodds? In this respect, politicians with
unusual personal names may have big advantages over those with more common names –
make way for Arnold Schwarzenegger and Rudy Giuliani, not to mention Barack Obama.
It obviously does not make sense that unusual political names should fortuitously receive
more protection than more common names in the domain space.
Other than the relatively unusual situations where a private individual’s name
may correspond with a relevant domain name, there are a few other practical problems
with the ACPA provisions protecting personal names from bad faith registrations. One is
that it does not have a global reach, although at least a federal statute is better in terms of
legal harmonization than a pastiche of often-piecemeal state laws.36 The other problem
with § 1129 of the Lanham Act is arguably general lack of familiarity with its provisions,
partly perhaps because they have been overshadowed by the UDRP which covers much
of the same ground as the ACPA in a quick, inexpensive, efficient, and, of course, global
manner. Since the introduction of both the ACPA and the UDRP in 1999, many more
complaints have been brought under the UDRP than the ACPA, even with respect to
names of private individuals.37 This is not surprising, but, as recent UDRP arbitrations
33

id.

34

As opposed to having used it.

35

15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s
consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.”)(emphasis added). 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d) would not have applied here because the ‘Kerry Edwards’ name was not trademarked, nor was it
likely trademarkable in the electoral context: Generally, personal names are not registrable as trademarks:
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (c). See also GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, ¶ 2.03[d].
36

See discussion of some relevant Californian state laws in Parts ___, infra.

37

For example, Roberts v Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr., Admin.
Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (involving the Julia Roberts name) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and
available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html); Springsteen v
Burgar, Case No D2000-1532 (WIPO Arb. and Medication Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Jan. 5, 2001)
(involving Bruce Springsteen’s name) (last viewed on march 14, 2007 and available at
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have shown, the UDRP is not as easily geared to combat cybersquatting involving any
personal names, let alone political personal names, as § 1129 of the Lanham Act.

B. POLITICIANS’ NAMES AND THE UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE
RESOLUTION POLICY
As already noted, the UDRP contains certain procedural advantages for a
complainant concerned with an act of bad faith cybersquatting. Its main limitation in the
context of political cybersquatting is that it does not specifically protect personal names
against bad faith registrations and uses. This does not mean that no private individuals
have attempted to utilize the UDRP to protect their interests in relevant domain names.
In fact, some celebrities have been quite successful in this context.38 Even some
politicians have succeeded here.39 The problem has been that, in the absence of a specific
protection for personal names under the UDRP, complainants must successfully assert a
trademark interest in their personal names.40 This can sometimes be done quite easily:

http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html); Rita Rudner v. Internetco
Corp., (WIPO Case No. D2000-0581, August 3, 2000) (involving Rita Rudner’s personal name) (last
viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at:
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0581.html); Helen Folsade Adu, known
as Sade v. Quantum Computer Services Inc., (WIPO Case No. D2000-0794, Sep. 26, 2000) (involving
Sade’s stage name) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0794.html); Friends of Kathleen Kennedy
Townsend v Birt (WIPO Case No D2002-0451) (involving Kathleen Kennedy Townsend’s name) (last
viewed at March 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0451.html); Ciccone v Parisi (WIPO
Case No D2000-0847)(involving the singer Madonna’s stage name) (last viewed on March 14, 1007 and
available at: http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html); Hillary
Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005) (involving the domain name ‘hillaryclinton.com’) (last viewed on
March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm).
38

For example, Roberts v Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr., Admin.
Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (involving the Julia Roberts name) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and
available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html); Ciccone v Parisi
(WIPO Case No D2000-0847)(involving the singer Madonna’s stage name) (last viewed on March 14,
1007 and available at: http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html).
39

Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005) (involving the domain name ‘hillaryclinton.com’) (last viewed on
March 14, 2007 and available at: http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm).
40

UDRP, clause 4(a)(i) (complainant must establish trademark interests corresponding with relevant
domain name as one of the bases for her complaint). This was certainly played out in domain name
disputes corresponding with the personal names of Julia Roberts, Madonna and Hillary Clinton. UDRP
arbitrators established that all of these people had trademark interests in their personal names to support
their UDRP complaints. See Roberts v Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr.,
Admin. Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (involving the Julia Roberts name) (last viewed on March 14, 2007
and available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html); Ciccone v
Parisi (WIPO Case No D2000-0847)(involving the singer Madonna’s stage name) (last viewed on March
14, 1007 and available at: http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html);
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for example, some celebrities do hold registered trademarks in their names if they use
them as commercial trademarks.41 In other cases, UDRP arbitrators have been prepared
to accept common law trademark rights in a famous celebrity’s42 or politician’s name.43
However, in the case of even famous personal names of celebrities and
politicians, UDRP arbitrators do not always accept a trademark interest on the part of the
complainant. When Bruce Springsteen and his management initiated a UDRP arbitration
for transfer of the ‘springsteen.com’ name from a registrant utilizing it for an
unauthorized fan website,44 the majority arbitration panelists were not convinced that
even a celebrity as popular as Springsteen necessarily had a common law trademark right
in his personal name.45 In the political context, Kathleen Kennedy Townsend failed to
Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005) (involving the domain name ‘hillaryclinton.com’).
41

For example, the singer Madonna has registered Madonna as a trademark. See Ciccone v Parisi
(WIPO Case No D2000-0847)(involving the singer Madonna’s stage name) (last viewed on March 14,
1007 and available at: http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html), ¶ 4
(“Complainant is the well-known entertainer Madonna. She is the owner of U.S. Trademark Registrations
for the mark MADONNA for entertainment services and related goods (Reg. No. 1,473,554 and
1,463,601). She has used her name and mark MADONNA professionally for entertainment services since
1979.”)
42

For example in the Julia Roberts case: Roberts v Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 (WIPO Arb. and
Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (involving the Julia Roberts name) (last viewed on
March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20000210.html), ¶ 6 (“Having decided that Complainant has common law trademark rights in her name, the next
consideration was whether the domain name <juliaroberts.com> was identical to or confusingly similar
with Complainant’s name.”)
43

For example in the case of the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ domain name: Hillary Rodham Clinton v
Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641, March 18,
2005) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (“The Panel finds that Complainant’s uncontested allegations
establish common law rights in the HILLARY CLINTON mark sufficient to grant standing under the
UDRP. Complainant alleges that the HILLARY CLINTON mark has become distinctive through
Complainant’s use and exposure of the mark in the marketplace and through use of the mark in connection
with Complainant’s political activities, including a successful Senate campaign.”)
44

Springsteen v Burgar, Case No D2000-1532 (WIPO Arb. and Medication Ctr., Admin. Panel
Decision, Jan. 5, 2001) (involving Bruce Springsteen’s name) (last viewed on march 14, 2007 and available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html).
45

id. ¶ 6 (“It is common ground that there is no registered trade mark in the name "Bruce
Springsteen". In most jurisdictions where trade marks are filed it would be impossible to obtain a
registration of a name of that nature. Accordingly, Mr Springsteen must rely on common law rights to
satisfy this element of the three part test. It appears to be an established principle from cases such as
Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the case of very well known celebrities, their names can
acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to rights equating to unregistered trade marks,
notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name itself. It should be noted that no evidence has been
given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired a secondary meaning; in other words a recognition
that the name should be associated with activities beyond the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a
composer, performer and recorder of popular music. In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from
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convince UDRP arbitrators46 that she had a trademark interest in her personal name in the
context of a gubernatorial election in Maryland.47 Interestingly, the panel suggested that
supporters of Townsend may have been able to assert a trademark interest in her name,48
and that Townsend herself may have successfully brought an action under § 1129 of the
Lanham Act.49
It has been suggested that the UDRP be revised to incorporate provisions
protecting personal names from bad faith registration and use.50 However, to date, no
revisions have been made and the World Intellectual Property Organization (‘WIPO’) has
suggested further inquiry into the need for such revisions.51 It should be borne in mind
that the UDRP is a global arbitration process. The protection of personal names on a
global scale may well raise a number of greater difficulties than adopting such provisions
at the domestic level,52 such as in § 1129 of the Lanham Act. On the global scale, there
are more names and presumably more people, even potentially famous people, with
similar or the same names. Additionally, different legal systems may well take differing
the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of this nature. As it is possible to decide the case on
other grounds, however, the Panel will proceed on the assumption that the name Bruce Springsteen is
protected under the policy; it then follows that the domain name at issue is identical to that name.”)
46

Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt (WIPO Case No D2002-0451) (involving Kathleen
Kennedy Townsend’s name) (last viewed at March 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0451.html).
47

id, ¶6 (“The Panel finds that the protection of an individual politician's name, no matter how
famous, is outside the scope of the Policy since it is not connected with commercial exploitation as set out
in the Second WIPO Report.”)
48

id, ("Here, the claim for the domain names is brought by the individual politician, and not by the
political action committee actively engaged in the raising of funds and promotion of Complainant's possible
campaign. Had the claim been brought in the name of the Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, the
result might well have been different. But it was not.”)
49

id, ("This does not mean that Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains express
provisions protecting the rights in personal names.”) It is not clear from the record why Townsend did not
pursue a § 1129 action.
50

WIPO, Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process: The Recognition of Rights and the Use of
Names in the Internet Domain Name System, Sept 3, 2001 (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5), ¶¶179-205.
51

id, ¶¶ 202-203 (“It is recommended that no modification be made to the UDRP to accommodate
broader protection for personal names than that which currently exists in the UDRP ..... In making this
recommendation, we are conscious of the strength of feeling that the unauthorized, bad faith registration
and use of personal names as domain names engenders. We believe, however, that the most appropriate
way in which the strength of this feeling should be expressed is through the development of international
norms that can provide clear guidance on the intentions and will of the international community.”)
52

See discussion of this issue in WIPO, Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process: The
Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in the Internet Domain Name System, Sept 3, 2001 (last
viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5), ¶¶179-205.

11

POLITICAL SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE
attitudes to the protection of personal names in the domain space, whether they be
political names, celebrity names, or private individual’s names.53

C. APPLICATION OF CYBERFRAUD LEGISLATION TO
POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING
There are some other possible legal avenues for politicians concerned about
political cybersquatting. California’s Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act (‘PCAA’), 54
for example, prohibits engaging in acts of ‘political cyberfraud’ which include conduct
concerning a political Website: “that is committed with the intent to deny a person
access to a political Web site, deny a person the opportunity to register a domain name
for a political Web site, or cause a person reasonably to believe that a political Web site
has been posted by a person other than the person who posted the Web site…”.55 Some
aspects of this may cover political cybersquatting, even though it is notionally directed at
conduct described as cyberfraud.56
Political cybersquatting would not likely be covered by the third statutory
prohibition on cyberfraud - causing a person reasonably to believe that a political website
has been posted by a person other than the person who posted the website. This is
because the point of cybersquatting is to sell the name for a profit rather than to make
misleading use of the site. It is of course possible that a domain name registrant could
use a domain name for both purposes: that is, disseminating misleading information
about a politician while at the same time trying to sell the domain name. However, the
‘misleading information’ part of such conduct is categorized throughout this article as
‘political cyberfraud’ rather than ‘political cybersquatting’. This is because there is a
need to separate and categorize different types of conduct relating to political domain
names in order to provide appropriately tailored legal solutions for relevant conduct.
It is possible that political cybersquatting would be included in the first two
prohibitions in the Californian PCAA. It may count as conduct intended to deny a person
access to a political website or to deny a person the opportunity to register a domain
name for a political website. The PCAA further defines political cybersquatting activities
as including, but not being limited to, the following conduct:

53

id.

54

Cal. Elec. Code, §§ 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005).

55

Id., § 18320(c)(1).

56

“Political cyberfraud” is defined in § 18320(c)(1) of the California Elections Code rather broadly
as: “a knowing and willful act concerning a political Web site that is committed with the intent to
deny a person access to a political Web site, deny a person the opportunity to register a domain name for a
political Web site, or cause a person reasonably to believe that a political Web site has been posted by a
person other than the person who posted the Web site, and would cause a reasonable person, after reading
the Web site, to believe the site actually represents the views of the proponent or opponent of a ballot
measure …”.
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(A) Intentionally diverting or redirecting access to a political Web site
to another person's Web site by the use of a similar domain name ….57
(C) Registering a domain name that is similar to another domain name
for a political Web site.58
(D) Intentionally preventing the use of a domain name for a political
Web site by registering and holding the domain name or by reselling it
to another with the intent of preventing its use, or both.59
These are all examples of conduct that might deny a politician access to a relevant
domain name, although they may not all technically amount to political cybersquatting.
A person who engages in political cybersquatting might not necessarily be regarded as
having ‘intentionally diverted or redirected access to a political web site to another
website by the use of a similar domain name’. In situations where the politician in
question has not yet registered a relevant domain name, it would be difficult to argue that
access was being ‘diverted’ or ‘redirected’ from the politician’s website to another
website. If the politician never had a website to begin with, this provision may have no
application, although it may well apply to a situation where the politician does have a
website, but has not registered all possible permutations of the relevant domain name.
Senator Barack Obama, for example, has registered ‘barackobama.com’, but at
the time of writing does not appear to have registered ‘barack.com’ or ‘obama.com’. If
someone else registered either of these names, as indeed currently appears to be the case
with ‘barack.com’, Senator Obama may be able to bring a successful complaint under the
PCAA60 on the basis that the name diverts web users from his own website. Presumably,
he would have to prove this to be the case in practice. It is not clear what would be
necessary in this context: for example, would he simply have to prove that consumers
were initially confused by typing the wrong domain name into their web browser and
ending up at the wrong website, even if they were not thereafter prevented from finding
his site through use of their browsers or search engines?61
57

id, § 18320(c)(1)(A).

58

id, § 18320(c)(1)(C).

59

id, § 18320(c)(1)(D).

60

id, § 18320(c)(1)(A).

61

This would be similar to the ‘initial interest confusion’ doctrine that has arisen in the commercial
trademark context with respect to a domain name registrant effectively confusing a ‘search engine’ rather
than an Internet user as to the relationship between a domain name and a trademark. Even though Internet
users would not necessarily be confused once they arrived at the site they were not actually searching for,
courts have been prepared to find the ‘consumer confusion’ requirement of trademark infringement law
made out on the basis of the notion of ‘initial interest confusion’. See, for example, Brookfield
Communications Inc v West Coast Entertainment Corp, 174 F 3d 1036, 1054-1064 (9th Cir 19999); Eric
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 507, 559
(‘[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform standard
for analyzing claims. With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut
down junior users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”; Panavision Int’l v Toeppen,
141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir., 1998) (consumers would not actually have been confused as to source by
defendant’s website, but may have been distracted from finding the plaintiff’s actual web presence).
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Similar comments may be made about sub-section (C) supra. ‘Registering a
domain name that is similar to another domain name for a political website’ may not
include situations where the politician in question has not yet registered a domain name
corresponding with her personal name. However, where the politician in question
already does have a web presence, this sub-provision may be more useful than subsection (A) because it does not require the complainant to establish an intent to divert or
redirect access to the website. It only requires registration of a name that is similar to an
existing political domain name.
Sub-section (D) looks to be much more directed at the kind of conduct described
in this article as ‘political cybersquatting’ than the other provisions. It prohibits
‘intentionally preventing the use of a domain name for a political website by registering
and holding the domain name or by reselling it to another with the intent of preventing its
use, or both.’ This does not appear to require the politician in question to have already
registered any domain name. It would cover a situation where a politician was prevented
from registering a name she wanted as a domain name by a registrant who either holds on
to the name and does not resell it, or by a registrant who sells the name with the intent to
prevent its use by the politician.
However, the drafting of this provision may still be somewhat problematic in the
situations described here as ‘political cybersquatting’. For one thing, the provision does
not cover situations where the registrant of the domain name is prepared to sell the
domain name to the politician for a profit. It only appears to cover situations where the
registrant is attempting to prevent a politician from using the name. Thus, it would cover
the situation where the registrant of ‘barack.com’ either wasted an important political
resource by simply holding it and not using it, or where the registrant attempted to sell it
to someone else who might prevent its use by Senator Obama. It does not seem to
contemplate a situation where the registrant specifically attempts to sell the name to
Senator Obama for a profit.
There are also jurisdictional problems with the application of the PCAA.
Currently, California is the only state with such legislation. It is not clear whether this
legislation would apply in situations where neither the politician in question nor the
domain name registrant is located in California. It is possible that the ability of web users
to access the website in California would be a sufficient connection with California for
the Californian law to apply.62 Additionally, it is possible that if the domain name was

62

Although some case law suggests that the mere ability to access a website within a jurisdiction,
without more, is insufficient basis at least for the assertion of personal jurisdiction against a defendant
website operator. See, for example, Bensusan Restaurant Corp v King, 937 F Supp 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
aff’d 126 F 3d 25 (2d Cir 1997) (the defendants who operated a jazz club in Missouri could not be subject
to personal jurisdiction in New York by the owners of a jazz club with the same name in New York City in
the absence of conduct greater than advertising their Missouri club on their website that was accessible in
New York City, although not specifically directed to New York City residents).
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registered in California, this would be sufficient grounds for Californian law to apply.63
However, if this was the case, clever domain name cybersquatters would simply select a
domain name registrar not situated in California.64
Maybe if political cybersquatting is regarded as a sufficiently important activity
for regulation at the federal or global level, certain ideas could be taken from the
Californian legislation and incorporated into either a federal statute or global treaty.
Alternately, at the global level, some of these ideas could be incorporated into a dispute
resolution procedure such as the UDRP. Domain name registrants could contractually
agree with registrars that they would submit to an arbitration procedure not unlike the
UDRP if a politician, or perhaps political party,65 later complained about registration of
the relevant name, particularly in the context of an election. The bad faith factors in such
a dispute procedure could be borrowed to some extent from the Californian PCAA,
although they should perhaps be a little broader in order to cover situations where the
politician in question has not yet registered any domain names. They should also cover
situations where the registrant attempts to sell the domain name to either the politician or
a third party. This approach may be quicker, cheaper and more efficient than federal
legislation or an international treaty, particularly a treaty requiring implementing
legislation.

D. POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING, DEFAMATION LAW
AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
1. DEFAMATION
Another group of laws that may apply to political cybersquatting conduct, albeit
somewhat indirectly, are various tort laws that protect individual reputations from
harmful conduct. These include defamation law, the right of publicity,66 and some sui

63

The ACPA, for example, is a domain name law that includes in rem jurisdiction provisions in the
case of domain names registered in a particular jurisdiction where the plaintiff is not otherwise able
effectively to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant domain name registrant: 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(2)(A).
64

For example, a list of ICANN-accredited domain name registries from all over the world is
available at: http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last viewed on March 14, 2007).
65

Political parties may, in fact, be in a better position than politicians under the UDRP as currently
drafted. See Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt (WIPO Case No D2002-0451) (involving
Kathleen Kennedy Townsend’s name) (last viewed at March 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0451.html), ¶6 ("Here, the claim for the
domain names is brought by the individual politician, and not by the political action committee actively
engaged in the raising of funds and promotion of Complainant's possible campaign. Had the claim been
brought in the name of the Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, the result might well have been
different. But it was not.”)
66

Michael Madow, Personality as Property: The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights in PETER YU
(ed), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE,
VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 3451 (2007) (The right to publicity “gives a
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generis state legislation such as California’s Business and Professions Code.67 The most
obvious tort that deals with a person’s reputation is defamation. Defamation generally
refers to false statements which damage an individual’s reputation.68 It may, in fact, be a
state or federal wrong, depending on the context.69 Although defamation may be relevant
to variations of the conduct described in this article as ‘political cyberfraud’ – see infra –
it likely has little to no application to political cybersquatting. This is because
cybersquatting does not deal with any statements that might damage an individual
politician’s reputation. Rather, it removes from the politician’s ready accessibility a
domain name that the politician might use to make statements in support of her
campaign. Thus, defamation need not be discussed further with respect to political
cybersquatting.

2. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The state right of publicity, on the other hand, could possibly have some
application to political cybersquatting. The right of publicity has been described as: “the
right of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness,
signature, or other personal characteristics.”70 It has further been likened to a trademarklike right in a famous person’s attributes in the sense that it protects the goodwill inherent
in that person’s commercial persona.71 The right of publicity operates much like a
trademark in the sense that it: “reserves to an individual celebrity the exclusive right to
the commercial exploitation of his or her name, likeness, signature, or product
endorsement.”72
To determine whether the right of publicity might have any application in the
political cybersquatting context, two fundamental questions have to be answered. The
first is whether the registration of a domain name corresponding with a politician’s name
celebrity a legal entitlement to the commercial value of her identity, and thereby enables her to determine
the extent, manner, and timing of its commercial exploitation.”)
67

See § 17525(a), discussed in more detail in Part ___ infra.

68

JANET L SILVERBERG, BUSINESS TORTS, 1-6, ¶ 6.01.

69

id, 1-6, ¶ 6.01 (Defamation issues have arisen in federal constitutional law since the United States
Supreme Court landmark decision in New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
70

GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, 1-2, § 2.16[1].

71

Id. (“The right of publicity is analogous to the right in a trademark. Both are exclusionary in
nature, giving rise to injunctive relief and possible damages when they are violated, and both depend for
their value to a great degree on public recognition, perception, and association. The goodwill which a
trademark symbolizes is first cousin to the goodwill, or reputation and fame, of the celebrity. These
establish the commercial value of the right to be protected, a value which in either case can be enormous.
They significantly enhance the sales potential of the trademark or celebrity-endorsed products with which
they are associated, and can create a formidable competitive advantage.”)
72

Id. § 2.15[1][b].
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for the purposes of commercial profit amounts to a ‘commercial exploitation’73 of the
celebrity’s name in the manner contemplated by the law. The second is whether
politicians are protected by the right of publicity in the context of purely political
campaigns, as distinct from other more commercial activities. Neither question has been
definitely answered by any state or federal courts or legislatures in the United States.
Additionally, the right of publicity is not accepted in all American states,74 let alone
globally, so that is an additional limitation.
It is not clear whether the commercial sale or attempted sale of a domain name
that corresponds to a politician’s name is the kind of conduct generally contemplated
within the right of publicity. Usually, the actions brought under this tort are concerned
with the sale of specific items – photographs, tee-shirts, magazines, toys, etc – that
contain, or are based on, an unauthorized likeness of a famous celebrity.75 On the one
hand, the sale of a domain name that corresponds to a famous celebrity’s name may well
be likened to the sale of a product that contains or constitutes the name or likeness of the
person in question. On the other hand, could the sale of an unauthorized photograph, teeshirt, or coffee mug bearing the name or likeness of, say, Britney Spears, really be
likened to the sale of a blank web page with the domain name ‘britney.com’, or even
‘britneyspears.com’? In the case of the physical goods, it would seem more plausible that
consumers would be confused as to whether or not the pop singer, Britney Spears, had
authorized the product line, than in the case of a blank web-page utilizing a domain name
that corresponds with her name. This is because the goods in question might constitute a
line of products that collectors may want to purchase, whereas a blank webpage – or a
webpage that is obviously for sale to the highest bidder - is unlikely to attract consumers
in this way.
Even if the domain name is regarded as a ‘product’ that is being ‘sold’ in the
political cybersquatting context, it is not the kind of product sale generally contemplated
73

Id.

74

GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 2.16[1] (“The publicity right is still
developing and the courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope. Precedent (or the lack of it) in the
selected forum may thus dictate reliance on trademark rights and unfair competition claims to the exclusion
of, or in addition to, the publicity right. In either case the celebrity may rely on his or her federal
registration, Section 43(a), common law unfair competition, and the same assortment of state statutes that
are available in infringement actions involving other types of marks.”)
75

Winterland Concessions Co v Creative Screen Design Ltd, 210 U.S.P.Q. 6 (N.D. Ill 1980) (dealing
with rock star names on tee shirts); Allen v Men’s World Outlet Inc, 679 F Supp 360, U.S.P.Q. 2d 1850 (use
of Woddy Allen look alike for clothing store advertisements); Hoffman v Capital Cities/ABC Inc, 255 F 3d
1180, 59 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1363 (9th Cir, 2001) (use of digitally manipulated image of Dustin Hoffman in
magazine). In this context, celebrity names will often attain a common law trademark status as well:
GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, 1-2, § 2.16[1] (“[A] celebrity’s name or likeness may
itself be a trademark, if it is used by the celebrity to identify the source of products or services and to
distinguish them from those of others. GLORIA VANDERBILT jeans, JIMMY DEAN sausage, REGGIE
candy bars, are but a few examples of celebrity-trademarked products. If the celebrity uses the name or
likeness in this way, he or she can ordinarily obtain federal registration, so the name or likeness will enjoy
the benefits provided by the [Lanham Act]”.)
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by the right of publicity. It is not really a sale to consumers of an unauthorized celebrity
likeness. Rather, it is potentially a sale of a product to an individual who might utilize is
it many ways – as an unauthorized fan site in the case of a celebrity or as a site to
disseminate information about a politician in the political context. In other words,
perhaps political cybersquatting is more like selling the means through which someone
may engage in conduct that may or may not be sanctioned by various laws – including
political cyberfraud laws.76 It may thus result in some form of contributory infringement
for some other kind of tort but may not in and of itself amount to conduct that would
ordinarily be proscribed by the right of publicity.
Even if this analysis is not correct, there is still an open question as to whether the
right of publicity protects politicians, as opposed to celebrities whose notoriety is based
on commercial, rather than political, aspects of their persona.77 This question was
recently cast into the limelight in a case involving Arnold Schwarzenegger, as governor
of California, filing a lawsuit against a manufacturer of bobblehead dolls bearing his
name and likeness.78 Although the case was settled, it raised many issues as to the
application of the right of publicity to politicians, as opposed to people whose celebrity is
derived from other means.
The issue was particularly confusing in the Governor Schwarzenegger situation
because he had attained fame and celebrity through sports, film, and political careers.
Had the matter been judicially decided, the court may have had to decide specifically
whether the defendant’s dolls were commenting on the Governor’s political persona – in
which case they may have been protected by the First Amendment – or could be seen as
purely usurping the Governor’s commercial interests in his persona and likeness.79
76

See Part ___, infra.

77

See, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage
Products, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev’d per curiam, 694 F. 2d. 674 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the right of publicity extends to ‘public figures who are not public officials’ in the sense of
holding public office); New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority, 987 F. Supp. 254 (1997)
(holding that then-Mayor Rudolph Guiliani could not succeed in a right of publicity with respect to
advertisements for the New York times that depicted him in a less than complimentary light, and that an
attempt to prevent display of the advertisements on public buses in New York City was an infringement of
the New York Times’ First Amendment rights); New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority,
987 F. Supp. 254, 269 (1997) (“Though the ad as a whole is commercial speech, the advertisement
undeniably includes an element of political commentary. It would be anomalous indeed to permit a reprint
of a caricature of Guiliani that had appeared in the magazine, but prohibit the Ad at issue which includes
speech of public interest.”
78

See discussion in Tyler Ochoa, The Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Case: Introduction and
Statement of Facts, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547 (2005).
79

Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads: The Case for
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 557 (2005) (noting that there is a public affairs exception to
the right of publicity in California, but that it would not likely apply to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead
dolls because they contained no discernable political slogans or messages, but were merely a depiction or
imitation of Schwarzenegger in the form of a doll); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech: Lessons from the Schwarzenegger
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 597-598 (2005) (“[T]he Schwarzenegger
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In the course of debates over the Schwarzenegger bobblehead dolls,
commentators noted how few right of publicity actions had been brought by sitting
politicians in the past.80 Various suggestions were raised as to why this might be the
case. They included: (a) politicians are often not generally concerned with commercial
use of their image ‘because it is not their typical business’;81 (b) politicians do not wish to
invest resources into such claims;82 (c) politicians want to avoid negative publicity that
may arise from such claims83 partly because they do not want to appear ‘humorles or
soft-skinned’;84 and, (d) politicians are aware that the sale of products bearing their name
or likeness might be protected by the First Amendment.85
A number of arguments may be raised in favor of extending the right of publicity
to politicians and other public figures who are not celebrities in the sports and
likeness was not being used to sell other products but was the product itself, albeit in a creative expression
of that image. The Schwarzenegger image was thus part of the “raw materials” or the medium that the
bobblehead doll’s creators used to convey the multivocal messages the doll communicated. This message
invariably comments, at least in part, on the Schwarzenegger political image and persona even if it also
simultaneously comments on the Schwarzenegger Hollywood movie star persona. The governor himself,
after all, has certainly made effective use of his Hollwyood tough-guy, “Terminator” image in political life.
Schwarzenegger, now the governor, has become the “Governator,” a play on words that evokes the dual
personas of the current Schwarzenegger image. This image is also used extensively in political cartoons
commenting on Schwarzenegger’s new status as a politician. It would be disturbing for a court to hold that
the right of publicity should trump the … defendants’ right to sell a doll that similarly comments on the
Schwarzenegger image. Such a decision would also be incongruous because it would permit
Schwarzenegger to monopolize his image as the “Governator” for both political and private profit.”)
80

William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the
Attenuation of Free Speech: Lessons from the Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45
SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 597-598 (2005) ([I]t was virtually unprecedented for a sitting politician to sue in
order to control the use of his or her image in similar circumstances [to the Schwarzenegger litigation].
The … defendants sold an entire series of bobbleheads depicting both living and deceased politicians; yet
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several politicians who apparently appreciated (or, perhaps, acquiesced to) having their likeness made into
a bobblehead doll.”); Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads: The Case for
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 567 (2005) (“Few courts have had an opportunity to rule on
an unauthorized commercial use of a political figure’s name or likeness. Politicians typically do not pursue
such claims …”)
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Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads: The Case for
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 567-8 (2005).
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William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the
Attenuation of Free Speech: Lessons from the Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45
SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 583 (2005).
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entertainment context. Surprisingly, there are very few obvious arguments as to why
politicians should not enjoy a right of publicity in jurisdictions where the action is
available. First Amendment concerns can be dealt with as a question of fact in an
individual case – as suggested in comments on the Schwarzenegger bobblehead
litigation.86 Additionally, many politicians have been, and will likely continue to be,
deterred from bringing right of publicity actions because of concerns about public
perception and perhaps also lack of success on First Amendment grounds.
The arguments in favor of extending the right of publicity to politicians include
the fact that in cases of pure commercial use of a politician’s name or likeness, there
seems to be no good policy reason for differentiating between politicians and other public
figures, like sports and entertainment stars.87 Assuming that First Amendment concerns
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Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads: The Case for
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 557 (2005) (noting that there is a public affairs exception to
the right of publicity in California, but that it would not likely apply to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead
dolls because they contained no discernable political slogans or messages, but were merely a depiction or
imitation of Schwarzenegger in the form of a doll); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech: Lessons from the Schwarzenegger
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 597-598 (2005) (“[T]he Schwarzenegger
likeness was not being used to sell other products but was the product itself, albeit in a creative expression
of that image. The Schwarzenegger image was thus part of the “raw materials” or the medium that the
bobblehead doll’s creators used to convey the multivocal messages the doll communicated. This message
invariably comments, at least in part, on the Schwarzenegger political image and persona even if it also
simultaneously comments on the Schwarzenegger Hollywood movie star persona. The governor himself,
after all, has certainly made effective use of his Hollwyood tough-guy, “Terminator” image in political life.
Schwarzenegger, now the governor, has become the “Governator,” a play on words that evokes the dual
personas of the current Schwarzenegger image. This image is also used extensively in political cartoons
commenting on Schwarzenegger’s new status as a politician. It would be disturbing for a court to hold that
the right of publicity should trump the … defendants’ right to sell a doll that similarly comments on the
Schwarzenegger image. Such a decision would also be incongruous because it would permit
Schwarzenegger to monopolize his image as the “Governator” for both political and private profit.”) Even
prior to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll controversy, suggestions had been made that it would not be
an impossible task to differentiate free speech concerns from purely commercial concerns in many right of
publicity cases involving political figures: Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV
1161, 1174 (1985) (“Where no legitimate first amendment purpose is served by the product, the
manufacturer or advertiser should be required to pay for the privilege of using the political figure’s name or
face to sell it. As an example, even though commemorative items may deserve protection in some
instances, it is hard to image [sic] that such items as “plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target
games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods” are a form of expression. An advertiser should not be
able to hide behind the first amendment simply because he has chosen to exploit a political figure.”)
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Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads: The Case for
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 565 (2005) (“The notion that political figures have no right
to control the commercial use of their names and images contradicts both the letter and purpose of right of
publicity laws. If the law did not apply to political figures, companies could freely exploit politicians’
names and images in advertising for their products, or on the products themselves, with impunity. George
W. Bush toothbrushes and Dick Cheney laundry detergent, for example, could pervade our supermarkets
and households.”)
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can effectively be dealt with on a case-by-case basis,88 there seems to be no good policy
reason why politicians who have spent time and effort developing their images should not
be protected from unauthorized commercial, as opposed to political, exploitations of
those images.89 This would appear to be the case whatever the theoretical basis for the
right of publicity – which is still a matter of some controversy even in traditional
celebrity-focused right of publicity cases.90
If the right of publicity is regarded as being theoretically based on Lockean
notions of property,91 there are good arguments that political figures are just as deserving
88

Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads: The Case for
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 557 (2005) (noting that there is a public affairs exception to
the right of publicity in California, but that it would not likely apply to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead
dolls because they contained no discernable political slogans or messages, but were merely a depiction or
imitation of Schwarzenegger in the form of a doll); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech: Lessons from the Schwarzenegger
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 597-598 (2005) (“[T]he Schwarzenegger
likeness was not being used to sell other products but was the product itself, albeit in a creative expression
of that image. The Schwarzenegger image was thus part of the “raw materials” or the medium that the
bobblehead doll’s creators used to convey the multivocal messages the doll communicated. This message
invariably comments, at least in part, on the Schwarzenegger political image and persona even if it also
simultaneously comments on the Schwarzenegger Hollywood movie star persona. The governor himself,
after all, has certainly made effective use of his Hollwyood tough-guy, “Terminator” image in political life.
Schwarzenegger, now the governor, has become the “Governator,” a play on words that evokes the dual
personas of the current Schwarzenegger image. This image is also used extensively in political cartoons
commenting on Schwarzenegger’s new status as a politician. It would be disturbing for a court to hold that
the right of publicity should trump the … defendants’ right to sell a doll that similarly comments on the
Schwarzenegger image. Such a decision would also be incongruous because it would permit
Schwarzenegger to monopolize his image as the “Governator” for both political and private profit.”) Even
prior to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll controversy, suggestions had been made that it would not be
an impossible task to differentiate free speech concerns from purely commercial concerns in many right of
publicity cases involving political figures: Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV
1161, 1174 (1985) (“Where no legitimate first amendment purpose is served by the product, the
manufacturer or advertiser should be required to pay for the privilege of using the political figure’s name or
face to sell it. As an example, even though commemorative items may deserve protection in some
instances, it is hard to image [sic] that such items as “plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target
games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods” are a form of expression. An advertiser should not be
able to hide behind the first amendment simply because he has chosen to exploit a political figure.”).
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Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for
Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1170 (1985) (“Political figures
have usually invested much time, money, and effort in building up a public image, just as entertainers have.
Few people are simply thrust into the political arena. By their own labors, in a very competitive field,
political figures have created publicity value in their names and faces.”)
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For a summary of the various theoretical arguments posited to support the right of publicity, see
Michael Madow, Personality as Property: The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights in PETER YU (ed),
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE,
VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 353-361 (2007) (describing moral, economic,
and consumer protection-focused theories underlying the right of publicity).
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JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), Chapter V (Locke’s theory
of property); Uhlaender v Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (“It is this court’s view
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of reaping the rewards of their labors in developing their public personas as celebrities.92
If the right is based on an associated tort-based concept of unjust enrichment,93 there is
equally no reason why a person who has not shared in investing in the market value of a
politician’s image should be entitled to reap the economic rewards of the politician’s
efforts: “No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay.”94 Even if
the right of publicity is regarded as being based in theories of personal privacy, it clearly
protects some economic benefits.95 Certainly, political cybersquatters are contemplating
economic benefits when registering domain names corresponding with politicians’
names.
Another reason why the right of publicity should be extended to politicians is that
failure to do so might result in politicians being unable to make a living after devoting an
often-significant part of their lives, resources, and interests to public service. Many
politicians will not try to make money from their names while they are in office,96
that a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality. A celebrity must be
considered to have invested his years of practice and competition in a public personality which eventually
may reach marketable status. That identity, embodied in his name, likeness … and other personal
characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property.”) For a critique of the application of this
theory in the right of publicity context, see Michael Madow, Personality as Property: The Uneasy Case for
Publicity Rights in PETER YU (ed), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND
PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE, VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 354-355 (2007).
92

Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for
Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1170 (1985) (“Political figures
have usually invested much time, money, and effort in building up a public image, just as entertainers have.
Few people are simply thrust into the political arena. By their own labors, in a very competitive field,
political figures have created publicity value in their names and faces.”)
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Michael Madow, Personality as Property: The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights in PETER YU
(ed), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE,
VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 355-356 (2007) (describing the case for and
against an unjust-enrichment model for the right of publicity).
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Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co, 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting Kalven, Privacy
in Tort Law – Were Warren & Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP PROBLS 325, 331 (1966)).
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GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 2.16[5] (on the distinction between
personal and property theories underlying the right of publicity and the relationship of personal remedies to
proprietary remedies); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1164-1166 (1985)
(describing the derivation of a Lockean property right in this context from a privacy intrusion tort). See
also Michael Madow, Personality as Property: The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights in PETER YU (ed),
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE,
VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 360-361 (2007) (describing personal autonomy
theories that might explain the right of publicity in terms of personal freedom, rather than personal
property); Mark McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U PITT L REV 225
(2005).
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Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for
Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1171 (1985) (“Most public
servants are not trying to make money from their names while they are in office.”)
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although some may try to make money from their names and positions to fund a
campaign for office.97 Assuming that most politicians will not make a commercial profit
from their personas during the majority of their political lifetime, should they be
potentially robbed of the commercial benefits of their names and images after they leave
office?98
In the electoral context, political cybersquatting activities may chill political
speech in the lead-up to an election which is clearly an undesirable and wasteful social
outcome. It is difficult to imagine that political cybersquatting could result in more or
more useful political discourse pertaining to a politician in the lead-up to an election.
Thus, political discourse is ultimately made more expensive by this conduct. In the
absence of the cybersquatting conduct, the use of the name in the political context would
be much less expensive than if a cybersquatter needs to be paid off to secure the use of
the name in the electoral context. Thus, the cybersquatter’s socially wasteful commercial
interests could chill protected First Amendment speech in the absence of some remedy at
least for the politician.99 It may be that the right of publicity is a plausible legal
possibility to address such conduct. If indeed there is no reason not to extend the right to
politicians, at least in contexts where the defendant’s use of a politician’s name or
likeness is for purely commercial purposes, then there should be no objection to
developing the right of publicity in this context.
There may be some question as to whether the right of publicity provides
appropriate remedies for political cybersquatting. Generally in a traditional right of
publicity case, a plaintiff will want an injunction100 to prevent the sale of the products in
97

For example, Senator Hillary Clinton has obviously used her ‘celebrity’ in publishing several
books that may not otherwise have been published, and this money can be used to fund a presidential
campaign. The authorship of these books was noted in the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ domain name dispute as the
basis for common law trademark rights in Senator Clinton’s name: Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele
Dinoia, Claim Number FA050200041461, March 18, 2005.
98

Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for
Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1171 (1985) (“[Public servants’
may … wish to market themselves for profit after they leave office. The decision to enter the political
arena should not forever foreclose a person from realizing the financial benefits of fame. If a political
figure has no control over the commercial use of his name and face until he retires, he may not ever be able
to realize any financial benefits from it. For a political figure to exercise the right himself while in office
would not likely be viewed favorably by the public and, if he cannot prevent others from exploiting his
fame, he will have little ability to market himself when he retires.”)
99

It is also possible that if the politician does not want to use the domain name, the interests of
cybersquatters should be secondary to interests in the name by other people who want to use the name for
actual political discourse in the context of the election as opposed to commercial profit. However, in this
article it is contemplated that politicians will generally want to hold registrations of domain names that
most closely resemble their own names in the electoral context.
100

GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 2.16[6] (“Upon proof of violation of the
right of publicity the courts almost always grant injunctive relief. Since the primary purpose of the right of
publicity is to prevent the unauthorized use of a person’s name and likeness, an injunction may be perfectly
tailored to prevent further violation.”
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question as well as perhaps an account of profits101 or some other kind of monetary
damages.102 In the political cybersquatting case, the politician in question will more than
likely want transfer of the name to her, rather than an injunction or monetary
compensation. Thus, the remedies for actions in the right of publicity are not as good a
fit for political cybersquatting as, say, the UDRP remedy of transfer of the name from a
bad faith registrant to a person with a legitimate interest in the name. Because the UDRP
is cheap, efficient, and global in its scope, and because its remedies are of the kind most
suited to political cybersquatting, it may be more sensible at least in the short term to
extend the UDRP to political cybersquatting than to rely on the right to publicity.
In summary, it is simply not clear whether, or to what extent, the right of publicity
might help to potential politician-plaintiffs in a cybersquatting action, at least as currently
framed. This may be a useful avenue of development for future law and policy, but at the
moment it contains many uncertainties, including: (a) lack of domestic and international
harmonization as to the contours of the right of publicity; (b) uncertainty as to the scope
of the right in the context of domain names reflecting a politicians’ names; and, (c)
questions as to whether the kind of remedies tailored for the right of publicity are really
what a plaintiff will want in a political cybersquatting case. Similar problems may well
arise in relation to other sui generis state law initiatives that might protect politicians
against political cybersquatters. An obvious example may be found in recentlydeveloped provisions of California’s Business and Professions Code.

3. CALIFORNIA’S BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE
California’s Business and Professions Code was revised soon after the enactment
of the ACPA at the federal level in order to deal with certain kinds of cybersquatting
activities. In August of 2000, the Californian legislature enacted several new sections of
the Code to counter these kinds of activities – with a somewhat broader scope than the
federal legislation.103 The new § 17525(a) of the Code provides that:
It is unlawful for a person, with a bad faith intent to
register, traffic in, or use a domain name, that is identical or
confusingly similar to the personal name of another living
person or deceased personality, without regard to the goods
or services of the parties.

101

id, (“The more common measure of damages in right of publicity cases is the commercial or fair
market value of the endorsement. Other losses may also be included, such as a decrease in the
manufacturer’s sales of a competing product properly endorsed by the celebrity, and an account for profits
may be awarded.”)
102

id., (noting that outside the ‘account of profits’ area of damages, general damages may be awarded
for ‘hurt feelings’ and that punitive damages may occasionally be awarded where the common law element
of malicious intent can be established).
103

15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d), 1129.
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This prohibition is broader than the personal name provisions of the ACPA104 in
several respects. The first is that it extends protection to a deceased personality as well as
to a living person. The second, and more relevant for the purposes of this article, is that
the Californian legislation sets out a list of bad faith factors that are somewhat broader
than those in the federal legislation.105 In particular, § 17526(j) of the Californian
legislation includes as a bad faith factor: “The intent of a person alleged to be in
violation of this article to mislead, deceive, or defraud voters.”
At first glance, this legislation appears to have some application to political
cybersquatting in the sense that the registrant in question has registered a domain name
that corresponds with the name of a living person without regard to the goods or services
of the parties. The real question here would be whether the registrant had an intent to
‘mislead, deceive, or defraud voters’. A political cybersquatter who is not using the
domain name to promulgate any message about the relevant politician, other than that the
domain name is available for sale, probably has not engaged in such conduct. Unlike a
person engaging in political cyberfraud,106 a political cybersquatter is trying to make a
profit from the registration of the name without actually disseminating any particular
message to voters.
It is possible that a political cybersquatter might be found to have infringed §
17525(a) regardless of a failure to satisfy the bad faith test in § 17526(j) on a variety of
other grounds. It is important to recognize that the bad faith factors in § 17526 are not
intended to be exclusive.107 Additionally, some of the other bad faith factors in § 17526
may apply to political cybersquatting although not, perhaps, as obviously at first glance
as § 17526(j) because they do not focus specifically on the political context. They
include:
“(e) The intent of a person alleged to be in violation of this
article to divert consumers from the person's … online location to a
site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill
represented by the person's … name either for commercial gain or
with the intent to tarnish or disparage the person's … name by
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship,
104

15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).
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The federal legislation’s ‘bad faith’ factors technically do not apply specifically to 15 U.S.C. §
1129(1)(A), as they are in the provision dealing with cybersquatting relating to trademarks (as opposed to
personal names) – 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(B)(i). However, those factors may well guide courts in
interpreting §1129 as there is no specific guidance as to the meaning of ‘bad faith’ set out specifically in
§1129.
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See discussion in Part ___, infra.
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The wording of § 17526 itself makes this clear by stating that: “In determining whether there is a
bad faith intent pursuant to Section 17525, a court may consider factors, including, but not limited to, the
following…” [Thereafter follows the list of bad faith factors.]
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affiliation, or endorsement of the site.
(f) The offer by a person alleged to be in violation of this
article to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the
rightful owner or any third party for substantial consideration
without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in
the bona fide offering of any goods or services.
…
(h) The registration or acquisition by the person alleged to be in
violation of this article of multiple domain names that are identical
or confusingly similar to names of other living persons or deceased
personalities.
(i) Whether the person alleged to be in violation of this article sought
or obtained consent from the rightful owner to register, traffic in, or
use the domain name.”
Sub-sections (e) and (f) are borrowed relatively directly from the policies and
principles underlying both the ACPA and the UDRP. While they appear potentially to
have some application to political cybersquatting, they both relate to trademark concepts
– likelihood of confusion108 in the case of sub-section (e) and bona fide offering of goods
or services109 in the case of sub-section (f). It may be that courts interpreting these
provisions in the political cybersquatting context would take the view that these bad faith
factors are related to situations akin to trademark infringement or traditional commercial
cybersquatting, and do not apply to political cybersquatting.
Sub-section (h) is borrowed directly from the ACPA,110 which in turn was drafted
in response to cases where cybersquatters registered multiple domain names
corresponding with well-known trademarks.111 It may or may not have application in a
political cybersquatting case, depending on the circumstances. In fact, in both the
108

15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)(requiring consumer confusion for registered trademark infringement
action); 1125(a)(1)(A)(requiring consumer confusion for common law trademark infringement action).
109

15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)(requiring commercial exploitation of relevant goods or services for
registered trademark infringement action); 1125(a)(1)(A)(requiring commercial exploitation of relevant
goods or services for common law trademark infringement action).
110

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII) (contemplating as a ‘bad faith factor’ under the trademarkbased provisions of the ACPA the defendant’s: “registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the
time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time
of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the parties…”).
111

Such as the conduct of Mr Dennis Toeppen in the early days of Internet domain name disputes.
See Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40
WAKE FOREST L R 1361, 1370-1371 (2005).
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commercial and political context, it is obviously possible for an alleged cybersquatter not
to register multiple domain names, hoping instead to make a profit from the auction of
just one particularly promising name.
Sub-section (i) might be the most fruitful avenue for a politician concerned about
political cybersquatting. The one obvious problem with the section is that it is not clear
who is a ‘rightful owner’ of a relevant domain name and on what theoretical basis.
Under modern trademark law it appears to have been assumed in many circumstances,
including the passage of the ACPA, that a trademark holder is a ‘legitimate holder’ of a
corresponding domain name, at least as against bad faith cybersquatters. It is possible
that the same may not hold true for politicians who may or may not be able to trademark
their personal names. On the other hand, if one takes the view that any form of
cybersquatting, including political cybersquatting, is inherently socially and economically
wasteful, then it might be easier to argue that a politician is the ‘rightful owner’ of a
corresponding domain name in this context. Thus, § 17526(i) might prove useful to
politicians who are the victims of political cybersquatting, depending on how courts
interpret the scope of this bad faith factor.
The Californian Business and Professions Code also currently has the same
practical problems for politicians as the PCAA. It is untested state legislation which has
not been adopted in other jurisdictions and, while it may serve as a useful “legislative
‘laboratory’”112 on many issues related to cybersquatting, it is not likely to be of much
immediate assistance to politicians concerned about this conduct.

E. POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
There are obviously various different avenues that can be pursued by politicians
concerned about political cybersquatting, depending on the context of the relevant
conduct and the jurisdiction. If, for example, a politician can establish trademark rights
in her name, like Senator Clinton has done,113 she will have more options for reprisal
against a cybersquatter, as she might avail herself of the trademark-based provisions of
the ACPA114 or the UDRP, as well as some of the other remedies discussed in the
112

REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1999,
SECTION 3006 CONCERNING THE ABUSIVE REGISTRATION OF DOMAIN NAMES, (last viewed on March 14,
2007 and available at: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/tmcybpiracy/repcongress.pdf), ¶ IV
(“California may serve as a legislative ‘laboratory’ on [the issue of use of personal names in domain
names].”)
113

Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (“The Panel finds that Complainant’s uncontested allegations
establish common law rights in the HILLARY CLINTON mark sufficient to grant standing under the
UDRP. Complainant alleges that the HILLARY CLINTON mark has become distinctive through
Complainant’s use and exposure of the mark in the marketplace and through use of the mark in connection
with Complainant’s political activities, including a successful Senate campaign.”)
114

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1).
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preceding sections. She might also be able to mount a traditional trademark infringement
action if she can establish the requisite elements for such an action, including likelihood
of consumer confusion.115 In the absence of a trademark right, other remedies might be
available, such as those arising under the ‘personal name’ provisions of the ACPA,116 as
well as potentially actions under the right of publicity or various state cyberfraud117 and
cybersquatting legislation118 where available.
The main problem with the current legal framework is that it is piecemeal and
quite context-specific with respect to political cybersquatting. Much will depend on
factors such as the jurisdiction in which the politician and registrant are located or in
which the domain name was registered, as well as on whether the politician can establish
a trademark right in her name. Additionally, the system is not nationally or globally
harmonized in a way that effectively deals with a problem that often has national or
global dimensions. Particularly in the context of a presidential election, people all around
the United States as well as other countries may want to register domain names
corresponding with potential candidates’ names with an intent to seek profit from the sale
of the names.119 Whatever the view one takes of cybersquatting generally, political
cybersquatting in particular clearly adds costs to an electoral system without providing
any specific benefits. Creating markets for valuable political domain names and
effectively holding the names hostage awaiting the highest bidder can be wasteful,
particularly in the electoral context which is time-sensitive.
One obvious answer to this problem, and to some other associated problems,
would be to legislatively ban all forms of cybersquatting. In other words, a general rule
could be adopted on the national or international level prohibiting all registrations of
domain names where the intent is to profit from selling the name rather than any
legitimate use or purpose of the name in the hands of the registrant. This would overlap
with the current trademark-based regulations,120 but that should not be a problem. It
would prohibit political cybersquatting as well as other conduct that wastes a potentially
valuable resource.121 Alternatively, one could do the same thing with respect only to
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15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
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15 U.S.C. § 1129.
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For example, California’s PCAA: Cal. Elec. Code, 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005).
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For example, California’s Business and Professions Code, § 17525(a).
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See discussion in Steve Friess, As Candidates Mull ’08, Web Sites Are Already Running, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, A13 (November 18, 2006) (noting global reach of this issue).
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Such as the ACPA and the UDRP.
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A good example of such alternate conduct would be conduct that might be termed ‘anticipatory
cybersquatting’ – where a registrant registers multiple domain names that do not necessarily correspond
with trademarks or personal names, but rather correspond with general ideas that may be valuable in a
particular field of commerce. For example, a registrant might register multiple variations of the word
‘sports’, ‘cars’, or ‘movies’ in a domain name – say, ‘cars.com’, ‘motorcars.com’, ‘carworld.com’,
‘caruniverse.com’. If the registrant registers enough of these variations, she could effectively pre-empt
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political cybersquatting, depending on the willingness of relevant regulatory bodies to
legislate more or less broadly on the question.
One problem with establishing such legal rules – either generally or specific to the
political situation - is precisely how they should be enacted and enforced. This is not
necessarily a new question. It was confronted to some extent by the drafters of the
ACPA and the UDRP, not to mention the various Californian statutes described above.122
However, legislation dealing with politician’s names or with cybersquatting generally
outside the trademark context may raise some new issues.
A purely domestic solution would require either federal legislation or uniform
state legislation. The downside of federal legislation is establishing which federal
constitutional head of legislative power might support such a regulation. Perhaps the
commerce power123 could be used on the basis that the conduct in question potentially
affects communications and commerce124 across all states. However, this would not
necessarily deter cybersquatters from outside the United States engaging in this conduct.
It is cheap and easy to register a domain name, even a ‘.com’ domain name, in many
different countries outside the United States.125 Thus, a federal legislative package would
require a jurisdictional provision, like the ‘in rem’ provisions in the ACPA.126 State
legislation, on the other hand, would not raise the federal legislative power issues, but
would raise difficulties of creating a statute on which federal legislatures could
substantially agree. It may also raise jurisdictional concerns and require in rem
provisions in case of domain name registrants situated outside the relevant jurisdiction.
The same may be said of approaches that seek to extend on the current state laws
that deal more broadly with bad faith domain name registrations than the ACPA. The
anyone who wanted to register a domain name to sell cars and hold relevant domain names for ransom for
an exorbitant fee. This would mean that the person wanting to enter the field could have to pay hundreds or
thousands, or even millions, of dollars for a relevant domain name instead of the standard registration fee of
ten to twenty dollars.
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Cal. Elec. Code, 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005), and Business and Professions Code, § 17525(a).
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U.S. Constitution, Art 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have power: “To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States…”).
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This approach was taken by Judge Wood in Planned Parenthood Federation of American Inc v
Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (in interpreting the application of the Lanham Act to a domain
name dispute, the judge noted that the statute, based on Congress’ commerce power, applies to Internet
domain name registrations and uses because they are part of interstate commerce both on the basis that
websites can provide commercial and informational services in multiple states and on the basis that Internet
users constitute a national and international audience who must use interstate telephone lines to access the
Internet), 10-12 (LEXIS page references).
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See, for example, the global list of domain name registries accredited by ICANN at
http://www.internic.net/origin.html (last viewed on March 14, 2007).
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15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii).
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two Californian statutes discussed above127 are obvious examples here. One difficulty
with extending these laws would come partly in the substantive drafting of the
provisions: that is, clarifying the current gaps in the legislation where political
cybersquatting is concerned, such as adding a new ‘bad faith’ factor to the § 17526 of the
Business and Professions Code specifically to cover political cybersquatting. Another
problem would arise in terms of the procedural aspects of harmonizing the laws to
encompass more jurisdictions. That would raise the same problems discussed in the
previous paragraph about federal or harmonized state legislation to prohibit all forms of
cybersquatting generally or political cybersquatting specifically. These problems are not
impossible to overcome, but they could prove time consuming and expensive,
particularly for legislation that has not yet been substantially judicially tested in any state.
An alternative, and perhaps more obvious solution, would be to add specific
personal name protections to the UDRP. In other words, where the UDRP is currently
limited to protecting trademark-based rights from cybersquatting,128 it could also be
extended to protect personal names against cybersquatting.129 This could be limited to
politician’s names or could extend more broadly to celebrities and other public figures.130
The broader approach would certainly cover some difficult situations that have arisen to
date under the UDRP.131 However, the narrower approach, focused purely on politicians’
127

Cal. Elec. Code, 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005), and Business and Professions Code, § 17525(a).
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UDRP, clause 4(a)(i) (requiring complainant to establish trademark interest as a requisite element
of a UDRP claim).
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As considered, but ultimately rejected, in the second WIPO report on the domain name process:
WIPO, Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process: The Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in
the Internet Domain Name System, Sept 3, 2001 (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5), ¶¶202-203 (“It is
recommended that no modification be made to the UDRP to accommodate broader protection for personal
names than that which currently exists in the UDRP ..... In making this recommendation, we are conscious
of the strength of feeling that the unauthorized, bad faith registration and use of personal names as domain
names engenders. We believe, however, that the most appropriate way in which the strength of this feeling
should be expressed is through the development of international norms that can provide clear guidance on
the intentions and will of the international community.”).
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id.
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Such as the case of celebrities who are undoubtedly well-known but who have been found not
necessarily to hold common law trademark rights in their personal names. See, for example, Springsteen v
Burgar, Case No D2000-1532 (WIPO Arb. and Medication Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Jan. 5, 2001)
(involving Bruce Springsteen’s name) (last viewed on march 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html), ¶ 6 (“It is common ground
that there is no registered trade mark in the name "Bruce Springsteen". In most jurisdictions where trade
marks are filed it would be impossible to obtain a registration of a name of that nature. Accordingly, Mr
Springsteen must rely on common law rights to satisfy this element of the three part test. It appears to be
an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the case of
very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to rights
equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name itself. It should be
noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired a secondary
meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities beyond the
primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music. In the view
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names might be simpler and less confusing at least in the short term. This is because of
the fundamental importance to the democratic process of free and accurate information
about politicians, particularly in the lead-up to an election. Celebrities presumably have
less trouble under the UDRP, as currently drafted, than politicians because celebrities are
more likely to be able to establish trademark-like rights in their names, given that their
names and images are used predominantly for commercial purposes. This may be
compared with politicians who may or may not have established commercially valuable
personas. A politician who wants to avoid commercialization of her image may thus
currently be disadvantaged under the UDRP. The same may be said of a less ‘famous’
politician who has not yet established a major public persona. An extension of the UDRP
rules to cover politicians’ personal names would correct these imbalances in the system.
Such an extension is also arguably more important at the current time than a specific
extension of the UDRP to cover personal names of classes of people outside the political
arena.
The main advantages with this approach over federal and state legislation are
many. The UDRP procedures are fast, inexpensive and international in scope. The
remedies available under the UDRP are precisely the kinds of remedies a politician will
want in a political cybersquatting case – an arbitral order that the domain name in
question be transferred to the politician. The addition of a ‘politician’s name protection’
provision to the UDRP would be a minor drafting change and could be achieved quickly
and simply.

III. POLITICAL CYBERFRAUD
A. DISTINGUISHING CYBERFRAUD FROM CYBERSQUATTING
“Political cyberfraud” is defined in this article to include various categories of bad
faith content involving registration of a domain name corresponding with a politician’s
name. It differs from “political cybersquatting” in that it looks to the substantive content
of the relevant website in association with the domain name, rather than a simple attempt
to sell the domain name. Examples of cyberfraud would include publishing misleading
or damaging information on a website about the relevant politician or a fraudulent
attempt to raise funds in the name of the politician under a domain name corresponding
with the politician’s name. The substantive content of a relevant website may or may not
be ‘legitimate’ in a strictly legal sense. However, cyberfraud is concerned with
publishing the content in concert with a domain name correspond to a politician’s name
in a manner that appears to cloak the speech with a misleading sense of authority or
truthfulness.

of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of this
nature. As it is possible to decide the case on other grounds, however, the Panel will proceed on the
assumption that the name Bruce Springsteen is protected under the policy; it then follows that the domain
name at issue is identical to that name.”)
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This assumes, of course, that Internet users would expect that a domain name
such as, say, ‘ralphnader.com’ would resolve to a website actually authorized, sponsored,
or maintained by Ralph Nader. In some ways, this is similar to presumptions that appear
to be developing in commercial trademark law with respect to domain names
corresponding with well-known trademarks. There is now some authority that
‘trademark.com’ names will resolve to websites authorized or sponsored by relevant
trademark holders.132
A domain name registrant committing ‘cyberfraud’ may or may not have an
additional purpose to sell the domain name, but cyberfraud and cybersquatting are treated
differently in this article for a number of reasons. Cyberfraud will obviously raise more
difficult issues of subjective judgment than cybersquatting because when the focus turns
to evaluating the substantive content of a website, more difficult interpretive questions
will arise than in cases of pure waste of a domain name resource. This is why, in many
ways, pure cybersquatting will be much easier to regulate than cyberfraud. It will likely
be much less contentious and will simply be a way of preserving available forums for
political debate and preventing waste of those resources, particularly during elections.
Cyberfraud, on the other hand, might involve promoting certain kinds of political speech
above other kinds of political speech in an electoral context. Not only might these
questions be much more subjective than questions involving pure cybersquatting, but
their resolutions might differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from culture to culture.
Thus, regulation should probably be as minimally invasive of speech as possible, and
these issues might lend themselves more appropriately to local, rather than global,
regulation, again unlike cybersquatting.
Additionally, some aspects of conduct described here as cyberfraud may already
be covered by relevant local laws and may not, in fact, need as much legislative or
regulatory reform as pure political cybersquatting. The promulgation of defamatory
messages about a politician on a website regardless of the domain name used may well be
the subject of a successful defamation action under current law. Attempting to defraud
the public and raise money fraudulently under a politician’s name (and domain name)
would presumably contravene various criminal statutes.133 Of course, conduct like this
arguably has two parts: one is the website content and the other is the unauthorized use
of a domain name corresponding with a politician’s name. It may be that current
defamation and fraud laws cover much of the conduct relating to web content, but that it
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See discussion in Part ___, infra.
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The Federal Department of Justice has defined “Internet Fraud” as follows: “The term "Internet
fraud" refers generally to any type of fraud scheme that uses one or more components of the Internet - such
as chat rooms, e-mail, message boards, or Web sites - to present fraudulent solicitations to prospective
victims, to conduct fraudulent transactions, or to transmit the proceeds of fraud to financial institutions or
to other connected with the scheme.” (see Department of Justice, Internet Fraud, last viewed on March 14,
2007 and available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/Internet.htm). While the Department of Justice
does not appear to be actively focusing on political fraud at this time, it appears to be increasingly
concerned with criminal prosecutions for Internet fraud generally.
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is necessary to have additional laws relating to the use of a domain name corresponding
to a politician’s name in this context.
This might be somewhat akin to the registration of a domain name corresponding
with a trademark to promulgate a misleading or deceptive message about the trademark
holder. Such conduct has been variously dealt with under current trademark laws.
However, it raises additional dimensions in the political context because of the
importance of free speech in political discourse. Additionally, it is arguable that legal
regulation in the political context, compared with the trademark context, should not be
based on the notion of a property-like right in a personal name. While trademarks have
clearly attained a property-like status within our legal system,134 it is not clear that
politician’s names have achieved a similar status. Even in the context of the right of
publicity, it is not clear that politician’s names should be treated in the same was as
celebrities’ names because of the trademark-like status of a celebrity’s persona compared
to a politician’s name and likeness.135
In the political context, it is more appropriate for the theoretical basis underlying
the protection of a politician’s name in a corresponding domain space to reside in notions
of democratic government and free speech, rather than in notions of property. It seems
intuitive that at least the most obvious iterations of a politician’s name should be
protected in a domain space for that politician’s own purposes. This probably accords
with voter expectations and is likely the most effective presumption for preserving and
facilitating political debate, particularly in an electoral context. However, the reservation
of the domain name – or at least ‘first rights’ in the domain name – to the politician in
question should not extend to blocking all iterations of that person’s name in the domain
space for legitimate political discussion purposes. In other words, if someone wanted to
register ‘hillarysucks.com’ for a website critical of Senator Clinton, that should be
permitted if the more obvious versions of her name are reserved to Senator Clinton –
such as ‘hillaryclinton.com’.
To this end, even if the theoretical basis underlying protection of a politician’s
name in the domain space is different from the theory behind protecting a trademark
holder’s interest in a domain name, the results may be similar. If the social expectations
are that the ‘rightful’ holder of the name is the politician or the trademark-holder,
depending on the context, it is possible to draw into the political context some principles
134

Trademarks are often colloquially referred to as ‘property’ rights although technically they are not
‘property’ in more traditional senses of the word: Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, Trademarks and
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 777, 788 (2004) (“trademarks are not
property rights in gross, but limited entitlements to protect against uses that diminish the informative value
of marks”); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE LAW
JOURNAL 1687, 1687-1688 (1999) (“Commentators and even courts increasingly talk about trademarks as
property rights; as things valuable in and of themselves, rather than for the product goodwill they
embody.”).
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As noted in Part ___, supra, a politician’s public persona is often not based on commercial
activities, but rather activities in the public service realm.
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that have been developed in the trademark context to date. This is not because a
politician’s rights in her name should necessarily be equated to property rights, although
that is possible. Rather, it is because the Internet is an important communications system
and the domain name system is a significant method for users to navigate that system.
Thus, the protection of social expectations in the domain space, whether those
expectations are based on theories of representative democracy, or commercial trademark
law, should be a paramount concern of regulators in this area. This appears to have been
the case in the commercial trademark context where a presumption already seems to be
developing in domain name disputes that ‘trademark.com’ names are reserved to
legitimate trademark holders, while ‘trademarksucks.com’ names can be used
legitimately for purposes of criticism and commentary consistent with the First
Amendment.136 Thus, the same may be said of political domain names – the
‘politicianname.com’ version could be reserved to the politician while other variations
could be presumed to be available for otherwise lawful comment about the politician: that
is, comment that is not defamatory or fraudulent.
Again, some of the Californian legislation relating to bad faith registrations and
uses of a domain name may prove to be a good legislative testing ground for these kinds
of issues and might inform debate at the federal level – or at least lead to a more
harmonized state-based approach to some of these issues. Although a number of
practical procedural problems arise with respect to legislation as opposed to revision of
the UDRP, as discussed supra,137 value judgments about balancing rights to political
speech in the electoral context might be best left to local judges interpreting local
legislation, as opposed to arbitrators within a global system. Arbitrators may be well
versed in trademark law and domain name regulation generally, but may have little
familiarity with local laws relating to free speech and the democratic process – and may
have different cultural and political ideals in this context, depending on their respective
locations and backgrounds.

B. CALIFORNIA’S POLITICAL CYBERFRAUD LEGISLATION
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However, such a presumption is not uniformly accepted. Compare, for example, BridgetsoneFirestone v Myers, Case No, D2000-0190, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, July 6, 2000, (last
viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html), ¶6 (“The Panel sees no
reason to require domain name registrants to utilize circumlocutions like www.trademarksucks.com to
designate a website for criticism or consumer commentary.”); Societé Air France v Virtual Dates Inc, Case
No. D2005-0168 (WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, May 24, 2005) (majority of arbitration panel
found that ‘airfrancesucks.com’ domain name was sufficiently confusing to consumers to order the name to
be transferred to the relevant trademark holder – Air France). For a detailed discussion of relevant case law
in the commercial arena, see Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment:
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONNECTICUT L R 973 (2007). See also Jacqueline Lipton,
Commerce vs Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY L R, forthcoming, 2007.
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See discussion in Part ___, supra.
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Unsurprisingly, California’s Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act (“PCAA”)
appears to be a good legislative model expressly targeted to the kinds of conduct
described in this article as ‘political cyberfraud’. However, the provisions of the PCAA
are intended to be broader than to apply simply to protect domain names corresponding
specifically to politician’s names from misleading and deceptive uses. Thus, there may
be some difficulties and inconsistencies in applying the legislation in this context. The
legislation prohibits conduct of the three classes referred to in the previous section: that
is, (a) attempts to deny a person access to a political website,138 (b) attempts to deny a
person the opportunity to register a domain name for a political website,139 and, (c)
activities concerning a web site that would cause a person to believe that the website
actually represents the views of a proponent or opponent of a ballot measure.140 Probably
classes (b) and (c) are the most relevant to the kind of conduct under consideration here,
although some such conduct may arguably fall within class (a).
Class (a) may be less relevant here because if a person registers a domain name
corresponding with a polician’s name to promulgate a misleading or deceptive message
about the politician, she may or may not have actually ‘denied the person access to a
political website’. The access question would depend upon whether the politician in
question still had access to any relevant domain names to promulgate her own political
message. If the domain name registrant had registered multiple domain names
corresponding to the politician’s name and had cut off access to the most obvious
iterations of the name, such as ‘name.com’ and ‘name.org’, this might be an example of
cutting off access to a political website as contemplated in class (a). However, this may
also be regarded as ‘cybersquatting’ under the relevant cybersquatting regulations,
particularly if there is a corresponding attempt to profit from sale of the name. Thus, the
cybersquatting laws may deal effectively with access questions in the multiple domain
name registration context, and cyberfraud of the kind contemplated in this article could
be addressed squarely under classes (b) and (c) of legislation like the PCAA.
Class (b) would obviously cover situations where a person registers a domain
name corresponding with a politician’s name with a view to denying the politician the
opportunity to register that domain name. It is, of course, arguable that class (b) conduct
may not be judicially interpreted this broadly under the PCAA if this provision were read
as prohibiting attempts to deny a person the opportunity to register any domain name, as
opposed to a particular domain name. In other words, it is not clear on the face of the
statute whether the prohibition applies only to situations where the domain name
registrant has effectively cut off access to any relevant web presence via her registration
of relevant domain names, or has cut off access to one specific domain name. The
legislative phrase ‘to deny a person the opportunity to register a domain name for a
political Web site’141 is ambiguous in this context. Does the indefinite article refer to one
138
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or many domain names here? Again, one might need to consider precisely which
iterations of the politician’s name had been registered. The denial of ‘name.com’ and
‘name.org’ to the politician should perhaps raise more red flags than ‘namesucks.com’ or
even the less pejorative, but also less intuitive, ‘nameinfo.com’ or even ‘name.info’.
Class (c) may be more promising for victims of the kind of political cyberfraud
under discussion in this article. This class refers to conduct that causes an Internet user to
believe that a website has been posted by someone other than the person who posted it.
This would clearly contemplate conduct where a person registered a domain name
corresponding with a politician’s name for the purposes of promulgating a misleading
message about the politician’s views. Some of these situations may also be caught by
defamation law, depending on the content of the website. However, the PCAA may well
cast a broader net here and be cheaper and easier to litigate that defamation. All that a
victim of class (c) conduct would have to prove is that the way the website in question
has been used suggests an affiliation with the relevant politician that does not exist. This
could be established by proving that the defendant had registered a domain name
corresponding with the politician’s name to provide messages about the politician
regardless of whether the messages were defamatory or not. The ‘misleading’ conduct
would simply be using the politician’s name in the domain name for an unauthorized,
unofficial website about the politician.142
Taking this view of the interpretation of class (c) conduct is somewhat akin to the
developing trademark law principle that ‘trademark.com’ names should be reserved to
legitimate trademark holders on the basis that any other presumption would potentially
mislead consumers or dilute the relevant trademark. Taking this analogy further, it may
be that registering a ‘namesucks.com’ domain name would not fall afoul of this provision
on the basis that adding an obviously pejorative term to the politician’s name in the
domain space would not mislead Internet users to think that the site actually reflected the
relevant politician’s views.
In sum, legislative provisions like some of those found in the PCAA might be
good models for providing politicians with some protection against political cyberfraud,
as well as cybersquatting in some cases. Such provisions may prove to be an effective
complement to defamation laws applied online to the extent that those laws sufficiently
protect politicians – and public expectations – against the kind of conduct contemplated
here. Because ‘cyberfraud’ is a somewhat more subjective term than ‘cybersqsuatting’,
at least as contemplated in this article, it may not matter if protection for politicians here
is piecemeal and derives organically through the development of state legislation as
interpreted by the courts. Ultimately, this might be the most effective way of developing
appropriate legislative and judicial presumptions to protect free speech during an election
142

There may be some First Amendment concerns here as to whether, in this context, this provision,
or any similar provision that may ever be debated at the federal level, would survive judicial scrutiny as a
content-based restriction on First Amendment freedoms. At the date of writing, there is, as yet, no judicial
interpretation on relevant issues, such as whether such a provision could be regarded as a content-based
restriction on speech and, if so, whether it would survive strict scrutiny.
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campaign in the most effective way possible – in order both to facilitate politicians
disseminating their messages to voters as well as to facilitate general engagement with
the political process by the public. Questions about where lines should be drawn between
conduct that amounts to ‘cyberfraud’ and legitimate comment about a politician should
perhaps best be left to courts and state legislatures to develop over time.
Some presumptions from domain name disputes involving trademark rights may
be useful here as described in the previous section. An obvious example is the adoption
of a presumption that ‘name.com’ and perhaps ‘name.org’ domains be reserved to
relevant politicians while other variations of those names such as ‘namesucks.com’ or
‘namecommentary.com’ should be made available for legitimate, if unauthorized,
comments about politicians.

C. LAWS PROTECTING PERSONAL REPUTATION
Some of the ‘personal reputation’ laws discussed with respect to political
cybersquatting supra may also have some application to political cyberfraud.
Defamation is an obvious contender here. Also, the right of publicity may have some
application, although this seems less likely because of the focus of that right on attempts
to use a famous name or likeness to commercialize on the success of another, as opposed
to commenting on another. State legislation like California’s Business and Professions
Code may have some application here, although it is more clearly directed to
cybersquatting conduct. As described in the cybersquatting discussion supra, § 17525(a)
of the Code prohibits the bad faith registration, trafficking or use of a domain name that
is identical or confusingly similar to the personal name of another person. This would
certainly cover the registration or use of a domain name corresponding with a politician’s
name for ‘bad faith’ purposes such as promulgating a misleading message about the
politician. Again, it will be task for the judiciary to establish the boundaries of ‘bad faith’
in this context. Looking at the legislative guidance on bad faith within the statute, three
classes of conduct described in the legislation may be particularly relevant to political
cyberfraud. They are found in §§ 17526(e), (i) and (j) respectively.
Sub-section 17526(e) contemplates as a bad faith factor: “The intent of a person
… to divert consumers from the person’s … online location to a site accessible under the
domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the person’s … name either
for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the person’s … name by
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of the site.” As noted in the preceding discussion, this section is written in
trademark-based language with its references to goodwill and likelihood of confusion.
However, as also acknowledged above, it is possible to draw some lessons for the
political context from trademark presumptions developed in the domain space. If the
assumption is made that a website bearing a ‘name.com’ or ‘name.org’ domain is
expected to resolve to an official website of the politician in question, it may well be
regarded as bad faith conduct for someone other than the politician to create a website
about the politician using such a name.
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The legislation here is concerned with both profit and consumer confusion
motives – which seem to connote both cybersquatting and cyberfraud. Some cyberfraud
will fall within the concept of confusing consumers about the endorsement of a particular
website, regardless of whether the registrant had an intent to profit from selling the name
or not. Whether or not the conduct will amount to cyberfraud will depend on the content
of the website in conjunction with the use of a politician’s name, unlike cybersquatting
which only needs to look at the registration of the name and a bad faith attempt to profit
from its sale, regardless of website content. Thus, the Business and Professions Code
may cover either or both types of conduct depending on the context. It may be that a
particular registrant has engaged in both cybersqsuatting and cyberfraud simultaneously,
although this will not always be the case. The use of a domain name corresponding
letter-for-letter with a politician’s name where the website promulgates misleading
messages about the politician as well as offering to sell the domain name to the highest
bidder would clearly infringe the Code and amount to both cyberfraud and cybersquatting
conduct. However, a simple attempt to sell such a name without utilizing any web
content about the politician could be prohibited under the legislation per se as
cybersquatting. On the other hand, the use of the same domain name in concert with
content that confuses readers about endorsement by a particular politician143 could
contravene the legislation and amount to cyberfraud.
Sub-section 17526(i) of the Code contemplates as an indicia of bad faith whether
a domain name registrant ‘sought or obtained consent from the rightful owner to register,
traffic in, or use the domain name’. If we presume a politician is the ‘rightful owner’ of a
domain name corresponding with her personal name, this provision will certainly cover
some cyberfraud. The question will always be context-specific with respect to the
domain name actually registered and presumptions about the identity of the ‘rightful
owner’ of that name. While we may accept a presumption that Senator Hillary Clinton is
the ‘rightful owner’ of ‘hillaryclinton.com’, is she also the rightful owner of other
variations on her name like ‘hillaryclintonsucks.com’, ‘hillarycriticism.com’ or even
‘whyhillary.com’, ‘voteforhillary.com’ or ‘voteagainsthillary.com’? If we regard one
single politician as the ‘rightful owner’ of all variations of her name, this may well chill
political speech overall. However, by the same token, there should be some domain
space reserved for legitimate political messages to be directly communicated by the
relevant politician to the public.
Finally, sub-section 17526(j) of the Code contemplates as a bad faith factor the
intent of a domain name registrant ‘to mislead, deceive, or defraud voters’. While not so
relevant to cybersquatting, this provision has particular relevance for cyberfraud because
of its focus on the use of the name to interfere with the electoral process content-wise. It
must at least implicitly refer to the content of the relevant website and the relationship
between web content and the domain name in question.
Legislation such as California’s Business and Professions Code may well have
some role to play in developing the framework for political cyberfraud, as well as
143

For example, a deliberate misspelling of the politician’s name or a ‘politiciansucks.com’ name.
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potentially political cybersquatting. As with provisions of the PCAA, it may be worth
watching the interpretation of this legislation and treating California as a laboratory for
testing how courts interpret all of this legislation with respect to both political
cybersquatting and political cyberfraud. Obviously, state legislation that has no, or few,
analogs in other states can only provide a limited testing ground for the development of
relevant principles. It may be desirable for more states to experiment with such laws in
the interests of developing clearer principles about the appropriate boundaries for domain
name use in the electoral context, although this could also lead to disharmonization,
particularly in the context of a federal election.

D. POLITICAL CYBERFRAUD AND THE ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING REGULATIONS
Other regulations may also overlap in their application to political cyberfraud and
political cybersquatting. The regulations aimed directly at cybersquatting, like the ACPA
and the UDRP, may well have applications in the cyberfraud area depending on the
registrant’s conduct. Even though each of these regulatory measures is premised on
domain name registration or use with a bad faith profit motive,144 they may apply to cases
of cyberfraud where the profit motive overlaps with misleading or deceptive use of a
domain name in a political website. Of course neither of these regulatory measures is
likely to apply in the absence of a trademark interest in the politician’s name. The one
exception to this is the ‘personal name’ provisions of the ACPA which will protect a
person (including a politician) against a bad faith registration of a domain name
corresponding with that person’s name without that person’s consent.145
Again, the theoretical basis of the consent requirement is not clear from the
legislation. As this is a trademark protection statute, it would seem that the
Congressional power being exercised here is the commerce power and it is being used to
create commercial property or property-like rights in domain names corresponding with
personal names. However, as noted in the previous section, it would seem more
theoretically satisfying, at least in the political context, to base any rights in a domain
name corresponding to a politician’s name on notions of democratic government rather
than commercial property. Obviously, the personal name provisions of the ACPA were
not drafted with politics in mind, although some domain name arbitrators have suggested
that these provisions are the most effective way for a politician who does not have a
144

15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(a)(i) (“a person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark,
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties, that person … has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark…”), 1129(1)(A) (“Any
person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of another living person, or a name
substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s consent, with the specific intent to profit
from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to that person or any third party, shall be
liable in a civil action by such person.”) (emphases added).
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15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s
consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.”)
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trademark interest in her personal name to protect it against unauthorized incursions in
the domain space.146
The main problem with the personal name provisions in the ACPA147 is that they
will not apply to any kind of cyberfraud unless there is a corresponding cybersquatting
motive. In other words, if there is no bad faith intent to sell the domain name in question,
the personal name protections in the ACPA will not apply.148 Thus, if a registrant
utilized a domain name corresponding with a politician’s name to make comments about
the politician, no action would lie unless the registrant had also at some point attempted
to sell the domain name to the politician or to someone else.149 Thus, the ACPA
provisions will be limited to cases involving cybersquatting, even if they also involve
cyberfraud.150 As such, they do not add much do a discussion of pure cyberfraud that
does not involve such a bad faith profit motive.
The UDRP may be a little different here. Although, like the ACPA, it is premised
on notions of bad faith cybersquatting, it is a little broader in its drafting in terms of
coverage. To establish a claim under the UDRP, a complainant needs to establish that the
registrant: (a) has a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark in
which the complainant has rights;151 (b) has no rights or legitimate interests in the
name;152 and, (c) has registered and used the domain name in bad faith.153 Unlike an
ACPA action, an attempt to actually sell the name154 – or make some other form of profit
146

Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt (WIPO Case No D2002-0451) (involving Kathleen
Kennedy Townsend’s name) (last viewed at March 14, 2007 and available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0451.html), § 6 ("This does not mean that
Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains express provisions protecting the rights in personal
names.”)
147

15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).

148

15 U.S.C. §1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s
consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.” – emphasis added)
149

id.
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The same is technically true of the more trademark focused provisions of the ACPA found in 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d). That section is requires a bad faith profit motive, although not necessarily a sale motive.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (setting out the ‘bad faith intent to profit’ from a trademark requirement
in a trademark-based cybersquatting action, as distinct from the personal name protecting action in 15
U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A)).
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UDRP, cl. 4(a)(i).
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UDRP, cl. 4(a)(ii).
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UDRP, cl. 4(a)(iii).,
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As required by 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) with respect to personal names.
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from the name in bad faith155 - is not necessary for a successful UDRP arbitration. The
main problem under the UDRP will be for a politician to establish trademark rights in her
personal name. If she can establish such rights, then it may be possible to bring a
cyberfraud claim under the UDRP if she can prove that the registrant has no legitimate
interest in the name and has used it in bad faith.
The next problem would be in establishing the boundaries of ‘legitimate’ use and
‘bad faith’ in this context. The UDRP itself gives little guidance here. Although UDRP
arbitrators in the past have recognized free speech as a ‘legitimate interest’,156 this has
occurred in the case of deciding the boundaries of protecting commercial trademark
interests.157 Some have also presumed that free speech will be protected in this context
provided that the registrant has not usurped the ‘.com’ version of the name which
rightfully belongs to the trademark holder.158 It is obviously arguable that if free speech
is protected as a legitimate interest under the UDRP in the commercial context, it should
definitely be so protected in the political context. However, the assumption in the
commercial context is that the speech itself on the relevant website is ‘legitimate’: that is,
the speech is a legitimate critique or commentary of the relevant trademark holder.159 It
may be more difficult in the political context to establish whether particular speech is
legitimate or, rather, amounts to ‘cyberfraud’ – because of the higher protections placed
on protecting political speech over commercial speech in many jurisdictions.160 This may
155

As required by 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(A)(i) with respect to trademark-based protections.
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The UDRP ‘legitimate use’ factors do not contemplate free speech per se and are limited to the
various legitimate commercial uses set out in clause 4(c) of the UDRP. This list is not exclusive so
arbitrators have had some leeway to extend on it. This occurred in Bridgetsone-Firestone v Myers, Case
No, D2000-0190, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, July 6, 2000, (last viewed on March 14, 2007
and available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html), ¶6 (“The
question presented in this case is whether fair use and free speech are defenses to a claim for transfer of a
domain name under the Policy. Under Paragraph 4 (c)(iii) of the Policy, noncommercial fair use is
expressly made a defense, as noted above. Although free speech is not listed as one of the Policy’s
examples of a right or legitimate interest in a domain name, the list is not exclusive, and the Panel
concludes that the exercise of free speech for criticism and commentary also demonstrates a right or
legitimate interest in the domain name under Paragraph 4 (c)(iii). The Internet is above all a framework for
global communication, and the right to free speech should be one of the foundations of Internet law.”)
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id. (arbitration involving the Bridgestone-Firestone trademark).
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id., ¶ 6 (In this case, the Respondent’s principal purpose in using the domain name appears not to
be for commercial gain, but rather to exercise his First Amendment right to criticize the Complainants. The
use of the <trademark.net> domain name appears to be for the communicative purpose of identifying the
companies, which are the subject of his complaints. He is not misleadingly diverting users to his website, as
he has not utilized the <.com > domain and has posted adequate disclaimers as to the source of the website.
It does not appear that his actions are intended to tarnish, or have tarnished, the Complainants’ marks.”)
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id.
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See, for example, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority, 987 F Supp 254, 260
(1997) (“Speech is generally protected unless it falls in a category that removes it from the scope of First
Amendment protection …. In order to determine the protection to be afforded to the speech in issue, it is
necessary to decide whether it is entitled to full First Amendment protection or to the more limited
protection accorded to what is known as “commercial speech.” Once upon a time commercial speech was
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thus be a very difficult task to place on the shoulders of UDRP arbitrators who are
predominantly trained in commercial trademark law and not constitutional law in any
given jurisdiction. In other words, the boundaries of legitimate political speech under the
UDRP may be broader than the boundaries of legitimate commercial speech. However,
UDRP arbitrators may not be the best arbiters of where the boundaries should lie in the
political context.161
As with the ‘legitimate interests’ test under the UDRP,162 the ‘bad faith’ use
test is drafted in terms of commercial trademark uses such as misleading consumers as
to affiliation or source of a particular good or service.164 The two ‘bad faith factors’ that
may be relevant to political cyberfraud are: (a) evidence that the domain name has been
acquired primarily for the purpose of selling it to a rightful trademark holder or to a
competitor of that trademark holder;165 and, (b) evidence that the name has been acquired
to prevent the trademark holder from reflecting its mark in a corresponding domain
name.166 Although both of these factors are premised on the complainant holding
trademark rights in the relevant name, a politician might be able to use them where she
can establish that she holds such trademark rights.167
163

E. REGULATING CYBERFRAUD VS REGULATING CYBERSQUATTING

“deemed wholly outside the purview of the First Amendment.” …. Since 1976, however, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that such speech is protected although it “is entitled to a lesser degree of
protection than other forms of constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
161

Of course, a counter-argument to this is that the UDRP is only intended to protect commercial
trademark interests. In the context of protecting trademarks corresponding to politicians’ names, maybe
UDRP arbitrators are really only being asked the commercial question. However, this could be confusing
in practice if the politician in question is really concerned with defamation or other non-commercial
reputational damage. It may be better to label such situations as ‘pure cyberfraud’ situations and litigate
them under relevant laws such as defamation or anti-cyberfraud laws, discussed supra.
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UDRP, cl. 4(c).
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UDRP, cl. 4(b).
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UDRP, cl. 4(b)(iv).
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UDRP, cl. 4(b)(i).
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UDRP, cl. 4(b)(ii).
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For example, Senator Hillary Clinton in the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ arbitration: Hillary Rodham
Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641,
March 18, 2005) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (“The Panel finds that Complainant’s uncontested allegations
establish common law rights in the HILLARY CLINTON mark sufficient to grant standing under the
UDRP. Complainant alleges that the HILLARY CLINTON mark has become distinctive through
Complainant’s use and exposure of the mark in the marketplace and through use of the mark in connection
with Complainant’s political activities, including a successful Senate campaign.”)
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Probably the most confusing aspects of attempts to regulate political cyberfraud
relate to understanding the relationship between political cyberfraud and political
cybersquatting, and the reasons for distinguishing between the two. It is easy to take a
‘scattergun’ approach to regulation of both classes of conduct. In fact, this describes the
current regulatory situation. It is a pastiche of laws that generally attempts to regulate all
bad faith conduct relating to domain names, political or otherwise. The problem is that
these regulations have developed quickly in recent years without close scrutiny of
precisely what conduct should be proscribed, particularly in a political context.
Identifying the exact classes of conduct in question, as this article attempts to do, will
help greatly in tailoring appropriate regulations and remedies that do the least damage to
political discourse.
Current regulatory measures overlap in a seemingly vague way with respect to
political cyberfraud and political cybersquatting as demonstrated in the above discussion,
despite the fact that the two classes of conduct raise quite different concerns and call for
different kinds of remedies. Although both classes of conduct may overlap in some
situations, this will not invariably be the case. Political cybersquatting raises issues of
wasted political communications channels whereas political cyberfraud deals with
fraudulent and misleading uses of a political domain name. Political cybersquatting can
thus be regulated fairly simply and mechanically – either a domain name is being used in
a wasteful manner or not. A simple arbitration procedure should be able to be
implemented to determine this question. On the other hand, political cyberfraud raises
substantive questions of speech content in concert with a domain name that are better
regulated by those who are experts in balancing legitimate political speech against
illegitimate speech. Where the two classes of conduct coincide in a given case, a
complainant should be entitled to decide between the relevant remedial mechanisms, and
should be able to avail herself of both if necessary.
The problem is that current laws do not differentiate effectively between the two
classes of conduct and, to the extent that the terms ‘political cybersquatting’ and ‘political
cyberfraud’ are used at all, they tend to be used somewhat interchangeably.168 This will
likely cause confusions and problems of interpretation of relevant regulations as political
campaigns increasingly rely on the Internet and the domain name system in particular.169
Now may be the time to start unraveling some of the policies underlying the regulation
before the confusions become entrenched in the domain name system. Similar
confusions have already become entrenched in the system in the purely commercial
context, involving the interpretation of the ACPA and the UDRP in trademark-based
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As noted in the discussion in Part ___, supra, California’s political cyberfraud legislation, for
example, covers aspects of both cyberfraud and cybersquatting. By the same token, anti-cybersquatting
regulations such as the ACPA can cover aspects of cyberfraud where they coincide with cybersquatting in
practice.
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See discussion in Steve Friess, As Candidates Mull ’08, Web Sites Are Already Running, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, A13 (November 18, 2006) (noting importance of use of domain names in future political
campaigns, notably the 2008 presidential election).
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domain name disputes.170 This is largely because of a failure to appropriately identify
and categorize the competing classes of interests that need to be protected and balanced
in the domain name system with respect to trademarks.171 Similar problems could be
avoided in the political context with some regulatory forethought and planning.

III. POLITICIANS’ NAMES VS TRADEMARKS
A. “HILLARY.COM”: A CASE STUDY
The preceding discussion has argued in favor of identifying two specific
categories of bad faith conduct involving domain names corresponding with politician’s
names – political cybersquatting and political cyberfraud - and with developing
appropriate legal responses to them. However, one situation that can arise, albeit rarely,
involving political domain names involves a coincidental cross-over between the
commercial trademark system and the political system. It concerns the situation where a
commercial trademark interest happens to correspond with a politician’s name and both
parties desire use of a corresponding domain name. An obvious example could arise in
the situation of the ‘hillary.com’ domain name. Many people would think such a name
would relate to Senator Hillary Clinton. However, on typing the domain name into a web
browser, one would find that the name resolves to a web page administered by a
company, Hillary Software Inc, that appears to be a legitimate company with a
corresponding trademark or business name.
While this may be confusing in one sense for Internet users looking for the
website of Senator Clinton, it is obviously – or at least apparently – not an attempt to
hijack her name as a domain name to extort money from her for transfer of the name. It
is also not an attempt to provide any information about the senator under a relevant
domain name. It is, of course possible, that if Senator Clinton wanted that domain name
for herself she might make an offer for the name to Hillary Software, but the company
would be under no legal obligation to accept her offer, having seemingly legitimately
registered a domain name corresponding with their business name and trademark and
having used the name purely for their own commercial purposes in the software industry.

170
See discussions in Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment:
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONNECTICUT L R 973 (2007); Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce vs
Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, forthcoming, WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY L R, 2007; Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Names Past
Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L R 1361 (2005).
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Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark
Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L R 1361, 1364 (2005) (“The time has come to develop some new approaches to
domain name disputes that can take account of interests in domain names outside the bad-faith
cybersquatting context. This Article suggests a new classification scheme for different kinds of domain
name disputes. The new scheme can serve as the basis for the development of new approaches to Internet
domain name dispute resolution …. [This article] identifies the kinds of competing social values that will
likely need to be taken into account in future development of a more comprehensive approach to domain
name dispute resolution.”)
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Presuming that the registrants of ‘hillary.com’ have registered and used the name
in good faith for their own business purposes, they will not have contravened any existing
laws based on protecting trademark rights in corresponding Internet domain names. This
will be the case whether or not Senator Clinton is regarded as having a trademarked or
trademarkable personal name.172 In any event, trademarked or not, and registered as a
mark or not, Senator Clinton could not likely establish trademark infringement173 by
Hillary Software because of the lack of consumer confusion.174 It is unlikely that web
users looking for information about Senator Clinton and her policies would think that the
Hillary Software website had anything to do with her. It is possible she might argue what
has come to be called ‘initial interest confusion’: that is, where consumers are initially
confused on reaching a website and are then diverted from pursuing their original search
object.175 However, again, it is unlikely that Internet users seeking information about
Senator Clinton would find information about a software firm to be a sufficient diversion
to deter them from searching from Senator Clinton’s actual website.
Senator Clinton would additionally be unlikely to establish an infringement of the
ACPA provisions protecting personal names176 because such an action would require that
172

Generally, personal names are not registrable as trademarks: 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (c). See also
GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, ¶ 2.03[d]. However, even unregistered marks can in
some cases attain a common law trademark status. In fact, when Senator Clinton brought an arbitration
proceeding under the UDRP against the original registrant of ‘hillaryclinton.com’, the arbitrator found that
Senator Clinton did have common law trademark rights in the ‘Hillary Clinton’ mark which corresponded
to the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ domain name: National Arbitration Forum, Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele
Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (Claim No. FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005). The arbitrator ordered a transfer
of the name to Senator Clinton largerly on this basis. However, that arbitration was undefended and there
was no evidence that the registrant of the domain name was using it for any legitimate purpose, unlike
potentially the registrant of ‘hillary.com’.
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15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1).
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15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(A). This is perhaps similar to the results that occur in cases involving
competing legitimate interests in trademarks where only one associated domain name is available. See, for
example, Hasbro, Inc v Clue Computing Inc, 66 F Supp 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999) in which Hasbro failed to
show consumer confusion for trademark infringement purposes with respect to the use of the ‘clue.com’
domain name registered to a company called Clue Computing, Inc. Despite Hasbro’s registration of the
Clue trademark for its popular board game of the same name, it was unable to establish that the use of the
clue.com domain name by Clue Computing was confusing Hasbro’s consumers as to the source or origin of
relevant goods or services.
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Even though Internet users would not necessarily be confused once they arrived at the site they
were not actually searching for, courts have been prepared to find the ‘consumer confusion’ requirement of
trademark infringement law made out on the basis of the notion of ‘initial interest confusion’. See, for
example, Brookfield Communications Inc v West Coast Entertainment Corp, 174 F 3d 1036, 1054-1064 (9th
Cir 19999); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL
507, 559 (‘[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform
standard for analyzing claims. With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs
to shut down junior users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”; Panavision Int’l v
Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir., 1998) (consumers would not actually have been confused as to source by
defendant’s website, but may have been distracted from finding the plaintiff’s actual web presence).
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15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).
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the corresponding domain name had been registered with ‘the specific intent to profit
from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to that person or any third
party’.177 Assuming that Hillary Software did not register its ‘hillary.com’ name for this
purpose, it is unlikely to run afoul of this provision.
Senator Clinton would also be unlikely to succeed against the registrant of
‘hillary.com’ in a UDRP arbitration because the registrant could likely demonstrate its
legitimate use of the domain name under the UDRP criteria.178 In particular, the
registrant appears to be using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of
computer software services.179 For similar reasons, it is unlikely that Hillary Software
has run afoul of the various state laws, notably the California laws, relating to unfair
business practices180 and political cyberfraud,181 assuming of course these laws could
apply to Internet conduct affecting a New York senator. If there is no bad faith for the
purposes of the unfair business laws182 and no willful intent to deceive electors under the
cyberfraud legislation,183 these actions would not likely succeed. Further, if there is no
content about Senator Clinton on the relevant website, as indeed there is not in the case of
‘hillary.com’, proceedings under defamation or celebrity tort laws by Senator Clinton
would be unlikely to succeed.184
It is possible that Senator Clinton could succeed in a trademark dilution action,185
presuming she has a trademark interest here.186 Such an action is premised on the notion
of tarnishment or blurring of a mark.187 In other words, decreasing the ability of a mark
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15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).
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UDRP, ¶4(c).
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UDRP, ¶4(c)(i).
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California’s Business and Professions Code, § 17525(a).
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Cal. Elec. Code, §§ 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005).
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184

This is because these actions are premised on comments about the plaintiff in the case of
defamation, or attempts to usurp the commercial value of a celebrity’s persona in the case of the celebrity
tort. See discussion in Part ___ supra.
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15 U.S.C. §§1125(c)(1), 1127.
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Although personal names are not generally trademarkable (GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION
¶ 2.03[d]), a UDRP panel did find the senator to have a common law trademark interest in
‘Hillary Clinton’: Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (Claim No.
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005). It is not clear whether this would extend to protection of ‘Hillary’ as
a mark per se. Further, the UDRP panel’s comments would not be binding on a domestic court or even a
later arbitration panel.
AND PRACTICE,
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to operate as a mark and identify relevant goods and services. The problem with dilution
law is that it is premised on the notion that the underlying mark be famous188 and be used
in connection with the sale of goods or services.189 It is not clear that Senator Clinton’s
personal name would qualify on either count, although it is possible.
Is the answer for politicians, particularly those considering a presidential run, to
register all relevant permutations of their personal names as domain names as quickly as
possible190 and hope that no legitimate trademark holders have beaten them to it? At
least a politician who registers the name first might have more of a chance if a
corresponding trademark holder later complains about the registration, particularly if the
politician, like Senator Clinton could establish some form of common law trademark
rights in her own name,191 or at least lack of bad faith in the registration and use of the
name.
This practical ‘get in first’ solution would remedy potential cyberfraud and
cybersquatting concerns as well. However, it is obviously not very practical. For one
thing, politicians – and prospective politicians - do not always know if and when they are
likely to enter a political campaign and it seems unnecessarily distracting to expect them
to vigilantly register every possible permutation of their personal name in a domain space
at all times for avoidance of later problems – or at least the most obvious permutations of
their name.192 For another thing, politicians do not always want to advertise their
prospective political ambitions with such registrations – as registration information is
generally publicly available on ‘whois’ searches.193
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id.
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See discussion in Steve Friess, As Candidates Mull ’08, Web Sites Are Already Running, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, A13 (November 18, 2006).
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When Senator Clinton brought an arbitration proceeding under the UDRP against the original
registrant of ‘hillaryclinton.com’, the arbitrator found that Senator Clinton did have common law trademark
rights in the ‘Hillary Clinton’ mark which corresponded to the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ domain name: National
Arbitration Forum, Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (Claim No.
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005). The arbitrator ordered a transfer of the name to Senator Clinton
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For example, Senator Clinton may be much more interested in ensuring that an unauthorized party
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B. POLITICIANS VS LEGITIMATE TRADEMARK OWNERS: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
There are other more workable solutions to conflicts between politicians and
legitimate trademark holders with interests in the same domain name, particularly in the
electoral context. One solution would be a temporary compulsory licensing system under
which a politician could exercise rights in the name in the lead up to an election, and the
name could thereafter revert to the legitimate trademark holder.194 This could be
administered through domestic legislation or through the private administration and
dispute resolution proceedings of the domain name system. The latter might be easier
and would only involve adopting a simple dispute resolution scheme like the UDRP, to
be implemented in a similar way through contract with domain name registrants. The
difference would be that it would require domain name arbitrators to make
determinations as to who has a better right to a given domain name in the lead up to an
election. It would also need to give such arbitrators the power to order a temporary
licensing measure in favor of a politician. The trademark holder would receive a set
royalty fee for the use of the name during the license period, so this would be some
compensation for losing the commercial use of the name and may deter politicians from
arbitrating for names they do not really need. However, these kinds of arrangements may
cause problems for the trademark owner wanting to use the relevant site. A temporary
license in favor of the politician may be problematic as disrupting the business of the
commercial trademark holder. Also, the politician may want to maintain the site after the
election.195 At this point, should she be forced to buy the name from the trademark
holder for a reasonable market price?196
In any event, even without a licensing system in place, these kinds of disputes
would likely only arise in rare cases and some politicians may not care about all
commercial registrations of domain names corresponding with their personal names
provided that relevant websites do not include any misleading comments about their
campaigns and that other intuitive domain names are available for their campaigns.
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Again, Senator Clinton may be a good example here. She may not care that Hillary
Software is using the ‘hillary.com’ name for legitimate commercial purposes as long as
they do not allow that name to be used for purposes that might impugn her campaign
messages in a misleading way, and provided that she herself can use another equally
intuitive domain name such as ‘hillaryclinton.com’.
Another potential solution for the rare case of a conflict between a trademark
holder and a politician over a domain name could be a ‘domain name sharing’ order.
This could be achieved in exactly the same procedural manner as the domain name
licensing arrangement suggested supra, but the administrative order could require the
politician and the trademark holder to share the relevant domain name rather than for the
trademark holder to license it to the politician. This would be an arrangement under
which the domain name in question resolved to a page simply containing hyperlinks to
the relevant websites: in this case, one hyperlink to the commercial trademark holder’s
website and the other to the politician’s website. This kind of arrangement is
technologically possible with current Internet technologies and may create a fairer and
more efficient balance between commercial speech and political speech in these rare
cases. It may also deter registration of political domain names under ‘sham’ business
names that look on their face like legitimate uses, but are really set up in the hope of
extorting money from a politician for transfer of the name: in other words, another form
of political cybersquatting.
It may also have some application in the rare case of a conflict between a
politician and another person with a similar personal name: for example, if a private
citizen shared a name like Chris Dodd or Joe Biden with a politician. In the absence of a
trademark interest in either name, it may be that sharing the name is a viable option. In
the absence of a sharing – or perhaps licensing – arrangement in this scenario,
presumably the ‘first come, first served’ rule under the domain name registration system
would govern. The Lanham Act provisions, including the ACPA, are limited to bad faith
conduct with respect to domain names relating to trademarks197 and personal names,198 as
is the UDRP.199 If the private citizen had registered the name first and was not making
bad faith use of the name, presumably she would be safe from an ACPA or UDRP
challenge. This is where a sharing or licensing scheme may be particularly useful.
Alternatively, a rule could be developed for these cases at the local or international level
that the use of the name within the political process ‘outranks’ the use of the name for a
private individual in order to maximize the communicative potential of the Internet in an
electoral context.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
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The use of domain names and associated web content will increase in the political
context in coming years. The Internet is an unprecedented communications medium in
terms of being an incredibly low cost method of reaching a tremendously large audience.
As more and more people are connected to the Internet, and as politicians and their
campaign managers become more and more conversant with its potential, the problems
faced by politicians in terms of bad faith conduct involving Internet domain names will
also magnify. That is why it is imperative to start thinking about how the Internet in
general, and the domain name system in particular, should be regulated in the political
context as soon as possible. Although some thought has been given to questions of
domain name regulation in the context of commercial trademark disputes,200 little thought
has been given to the protection of domain names used in politics. The particular issues
raised in politics merit independent debate and perhaps specifically targeted solutions.
Some people may argue that the use of domain names in politics is simply part of
a larger picture about regulating the Internet more broadly. There are several answers to
this. While it may be true that much about the Internet in general, and the domain name
system in particular, needs to be examined from a regulatory perspective at this point in
time, there is something very special about the political process in a representative
democracy that may well require separate attention. The electoral process is fundamental
to our system of government, and the ability to disseminate and receive important
information about politics and politicians in an electoral context is key to the functioning
of our system. The need for electors and politicians to have every chance to fully
participate in the political process both as recipients and disseminators of relevant
information is of prime importance here. Thus, the operation of the domain name system
as a directory for such information must be facilitated by the legal system to the
maximum extent possible.
The use of domain names as guides to relevant information about politicians,
particularly in an electoral context, also points to an answer to a second possible criticism
of the approach advocated in this article to political domain name regulation. Some
would argue that focusing on the regulation of domain names at all misses the point of
what needs to be regulated on the Internet. Commentators have noted in the past that
search engines are now taking on prime importance as ways to navigate the Internet and
that, as a result, the use of easy-to-remember domain names is less important than in the
past.201 While this may well be true as a general proposition, this argument only
200

Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment: Searching for
Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONNECTICUT L R 973 (2007); Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce vs Commentary:
Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, forthcoming, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY L R,
2007; Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Names Past Trademark Policy, 40
WAKE FOREST L R 1361 (2005).
201

Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L J, 507, 548
(2005) (“Some searchers, frustrated with the DNS’s low relevancy or adverse consequences, like
typosquatting, porn-napping, and mousetrapping, may have become trained to start every search at a search
engine instead of entering domain names into the address bar. For some searchers, search engines have
supplanted DNS’s core search function of delivering known websites. In turn, top search engine
placements have eclipsed domain names as the premier Internet locations.”)

50

POLITICAL SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE
considers one perspective – the ability of sophisticated search engines to find information
as a result of a particular search query. In other words, while search engines clearly assist
with information location, regardless of domain name, they do not necessarily help with
the identificatory function played by many Internet domain names.
As with titles of books, songs and movies, Internet domain names serve at least
two functions. One is to describe the content of the underlying work or, in the case of a
domain name, the underlying web content. The other is to serve almost as a label to
identify the work.202 This enables people to refer to the relevant work (or, in the domain
name case, web page) by name when talking to others about it. It is clearly easier for me
to refer a friend to, say, ‘factcheck.org’ by referring to its domain name than by referring
to its general content or the search steps I took to locate it using a particular search
engine.203 Even when search engines are used to locate a relevant web page, some
research suggests that web users will often remember domain names in any event and
simply type them into a search engine rather than a web browser.204 This is further
evidence that the actual domain name retains its importance even when users increasingly
rely on search engines to locate web content. Additionally, even in the search engine
context, many search engines will prioritize web pages with relevant domain names,
depending on the search algorithms used. Thus, domain names will retain their
importance, despite the rise of increasingly sophisticated search engine technologies.
Thus, the regulation of domain names within the global information society is
likely to maintain an important place in future debates about Internet governance
generally. As described throughout this article, the electoral process raises specific issues
relating to domain names that are not clearly dealt with by the current regulatory system,
and are not really at the forefront of current debate, although they should be. This article
has been concerned with three distinct classes of conduct, all of which have raised some
concerns in the political process. However, to date, these classes of conduct have not yet
been clearly categorized or examined with respect to the specific issues they raise for the
political process and the domain name system.
Ultimately, resolving some of these issues may be a part of incidentally resolving
some other domain name questions relating to the protection of personal names in the
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domain space more generally.205 The ACPA provisions relating to the protection of
personal names against bad faith cybersquatting206 are a good example of a law
concerned with a broader question that may incidentally protect some politician’s names
against certain classes of bad faith conduct online. Nevertheless, the development of
regulations protecting personal names generally has not been a priority of the
international legal community, although there are some domestic examples of laws in this
area.207 Domain name conflicts involving politicians’ names and campaigns may require
more speedy attention than has been the case to date. Their resolution is certainly more
important than resolving issues concerning personal names that do not affect the political
process in any significant way. This is because of the fundamental importance of the
political process and the exponentially increasing use of the Internet in the political
context.
There are undoubtedly problems relating to domain names in politics that have
not been canvassed in any detail within this article. Intentional ‘mis-spellings’ of
politician’s names within domain names, for example, have only been incidentally
addressed here. This is because they largely raise the same issues as accurate spellings of
politicians’ names in the domain space and should be separated out into relevant
categories of conduct as such. A deliberate misspelling of Senator Obama’s name for the
purposes of cybersquatting, for example, should be treated in the same way as an accurate
spelling of his name. Thus, a person who registered, say, ‘www.barakobama.com’ in the
hope of extorting money from Senator Obama for transfer of the name to him, should be
subject to any rules developed to protect against a cybersquatter who had registered
‘www.barackobama.com’ with a similar purpose.208 By the same token, anyone who
registered the misspelling with the intention of making false and defamatory comments
about the senator might be subject both to defamation law in terms of the content and to a
cyberfraud regulation of the kind described in this article in terms of the association of
the false content with the domain name.
The main aim of this article has been to attempt to focus some of the future debate
on Internet governance on the issue of protecting political names in the domain space.
The key point is that the current system does not adequately protect politician’s names in
the domain space against various forms of bad faith conduct. Current regulatory
measures focusing largely, as they do, on protecting commercial trademark interests in
cyberspace do not effectively facilitate political discourse through appropriate and
effective use of the domain name system. In order to address the problems raised by the
current system, it is first necessary to categorize the problems, as this article has
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attempted to do, and then to moot potential solutions to them. Hopefully the above
discussion has provided some useful first steps in this direction, and the debate over
Internet governance can in the future better accommodate the needs of the modern
political process.
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